DEMAND DEFINITIONS NOT PROMISES
Suzanne Pepper


With the referendum now over, all eyes are focusing on the moderate Alliance for Universal Suffrage as the democracy movement’s last best hope. Beijing and the Hong Kong government are naturally eager to convince Alliance members that they should accept the official reform package. The Alliance has responded with a shortlist of demands. In effect, Alliance members want to know if Beijing accepts their definition of ‘universal suffrage.” They also want to know how the official reform package for 2012 can be improved in accordance with their definition.

This demand for definitions is long overdue. But until recently, everyone just assumed that universal suffrage meant the same thing to everyone. In fact, alarm bells should have begun ringing in December 2005 when the government suddenly introduced a package of political reforms that was almost identical to the current 2012 plan. At the heart of the 2005 package was a proposal to create five new Functional Constituency (FC) legislators to be indirectly elected by District Councilors.

Pan-democrats hastily mustered their forces and voted down the package. But they did so without explaining or even considering the long-term implications of the District councils plan. Afterward, everyone forgot about it, only to see the same idea reappear in at the heart of the government’s 2012 proposals. Yet even with decision time fast approaching, the implications of the District Councils plan are still not being discussed. Where did it come from? What are the precedents? Who is promoting it now? Who stands to benefit? And what does it mean for the ultimate goal of universal suffrage?

ORIGINS

The immediate origin of the current proposal can be traced to the government’s Green Paper on Constitutional Development issued in July 2007. This paper formally began the present political reform exercise in accordance with the new five-step procedure mandated by Beijing’s Basic Law “Interpretation” of April 2004.

The Green Paper presented three options whereby Legco could achieve the ultimate aim of universal suffrage elections as promised by the Basic Law.

The third option entailed allowing all 30 FC seats to be filled through indirect election by the members of Hong Kong’s 18 District Councils. According to the Green Paper, “all Legco seats will then be district-based seats returned through direct or indirect elections” (paragraph 4.14). This third option received no publicity in 2007 and the Green Paper cited only one submission in its Appendix recommending this option.

PURPOSE

The 2007 Green Paper seemed to have included the District Councils option only as an afterthought. But of course it was not. Throughout the consultation period for the 2012 reforms, official promoters steadfastly maintained that the government “did not have the authority” to reveal the direction their proposals might take beyond 2012. While they may not have the authority, officials evidently do have a tentative roadmap in mind and it naturally entails the District Councils plan.

Only after the consultation exercise ended, did Executive Councilor Anthony Cheung Bing-leung mention in passing (South China Morning Post, Feb. 19, 2010) that the government was planning to propose expanding the District Councils option for use in replacing the FCs, just as the Green Paper had indicated. During the consultation period, pro-Beijing Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong (DAB) supporters also referred in passing to such a future course if the experiment for five new Legislative Councilors indirectly elected by District Councilors proves successful.

THE ONLY PRECEDENT THAT MATTERS

Nor does the lack of transparency end there. Equally important are the omissions when citing precedents to legitimize indirect elections. The Green Paper noted only that in international practice or “overseas jurisdictions,” universal suffrage one-person-one-vote systems “can take the form of direct or indirect election” (paragraph 2.24). At public consultation forums, supporters of the government’s 2012 proposals liked to cite various examples in Europe and the United States where Western democratic systems combine both direct and indirect elections.

When speakers were reminded that Hong Kong is part of China not Europe or the U.S., they had no answer. When asked specifically why they never cited Chinese precedents, both democrats and government supporters also had no answer. In fact, for Hong Kong now, there is only one precedent that matters, namely, China’s People’s Congress system, which is the government structure through which the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) exercises its leadership.

Article 3 of the Chinese Constitution specifics that the: “National People’s Congress and the local people’s congresses at various levels are constituted through elections.” Articles 59 and 97 spell out the arrangements for these elections. National deputies and those to the people’s congresses of provinces and large cities are all elected indirectly by the congresses at the next lower level; deputies to congresses of counties, small cities, city districts, and townships “are elected directly by their constituencies.”

Article 34 grants all Chinese citizens over the age of 18 the right to vote and to contest these elections.

The Hong Kong public knows and fears the mainland system of CCP-led dictatorship but has little knowledge about these electoral mechanisms and governing institutions through which that dictatorship is exercised nationwide. Even some Alliance members do not know that the small grassroots constituencies at the base of China’s People’s Congress pyramid directly elect local congresses and village committees on a one-person-one-vote basis. That CCP branches and leaders vet candidates and dominate the system from top to bottom is known or at least assumed. That 2.3 million Chinese citizens have been directly elected to over 600,000 village committees since 1988 (China Daily, March 2, 2010) is not known. Nor is its significance appreciated as the precedent for Hong Kong’s new District Councils plan.

WHO BENEFITS?

Clearly, the DAB with its 12,000+ membership and many district-level satellite groups would be the main beneficiary of the government’s District Councils plan. Recently, some democratic politicians have begun openly referring to the DAB as “the communist party” and they debate among themselves the wisdom of “outing” Hong Kong’s underground CCP branch. But its presence is an open secret as are its presumed leading members who overlap with those of the DAB. The latter is, in any case, modeled on the CCP as a mass-based hierarchical organization that is invariably loyal to Beijing’s policy decisions.

Unfortunately for pan-democrats, they cannot compete with the DAB at the District Council level where democratic strength has always been weakest. Even in the 1980s, when the District Councils were called District Boards, democratic activists found themselves at a disadvantage. Constituencies were not drawn district-wide but broken up into 400 small segments with each board member elected by only a few thousand voters form his/her immediate neighborhood. The boards were also concerned only with neighborhood amenities and a division-of-labor developed: conservatives dominated the District Councils while democrats set their sights higher at the Legislative Council level.

No one seems to have appreciated the political potential of this arrangement until the DAB realized how easily it could be exploited by simply building on the existing traditional street associations, charities, and neighborhood recreational facilities. Today these activities are supported by a dense array of well-funded conservative organizations and full-time paid DAB staffers in every district that under-funded and over-worked democrats cannot hope to match.

WHAT IS UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE?

It follows that the main question everyone should be asking is: what does Beijing mean by universal suffrage? According to Beijing’s December 2007 decision, 2020 is the earliest date that Hong Kong can have a universal suffrage election for Legco. Everyone agrees that one-country-two-systems is a temporary arrangement designed to ease Hong Kong’s transition to full integration within China’s political system by 2047. In 2020, therefore, Hong Kong will be just about half way “home.”

If the District Councils plan proceeds as the government hopes, half of Legco will then be indirectly elected by District Councilors and Hong Kong will be on course to merge with the mainland People’s Congress system. Hong Kong will also have a form of “universal suffrage,” based like the mainland system today on a foundation of one-person-one-vote at the grassroots level. But if China is still governed under the same one-party system, and if the DAB is still organized in its present form, then the imposition of one-party CCP rule in Hong Kong will also be well on its way to realization by 2020.

If Hong Kong is satisfied with that prospect, then so be it. But if Hong Kong does not want to take such a risk with its future, then answers to all these questions should be provided now, while there is still time to chart another course. Above all, the public should not be led blindly into a system the political implications of which have been explained to only a select few “insiders.” The District Councils plan is actually a “People’s Congress plan” and should be known for what it is.
 

THE “NEW FUNCTIONAL CONSTITUENCIES”
AND HONG KONG’S POLITICAL FUTURE
Are pan-democrats losing the battle for public opinion? If the polls conducted so far on the government’s 2012 political reform proposals are any indication, the answer is not necessarily “yes,” but it soon will be unless the public can be provided with a clearer picture of what the proposals mean for Hong Kong’s political future. Hong Kong University pollsters conducted three surveys asking how much people knew about the government’s reform proposals. At the start of the official three-month consultation period last November, 68% of those responding said they knew little about them. By early February shortly before the public consultation ended, respondents saying they understood little had risen to 70% (HKU POP release on political reform, Feb. 8, 2010: http: //hkupop.hku.hk/ ).

Those respondents should not be blamed for failing to pay attention. Instead, they should be congratulated since they were clearheaded enough to understand and honest enough to admit that they did not know what the political reform proposals entailed. In fact, the respondents were saying something important about the lack of transparency in the government’s official presentation, and also about the failure of pan-democrats to fill in the blanks.

The most important blanks that need filling in are those surrounding what are now being called the “new Functional Constituencies” or the “District Councils plan.” According to the government’s political reform proposals, five new Functional Constituency (FC) seats will be added in the Legislative Council (Legco) to balance the five new seats directly elected by geographical constituency voters. Beijing has instructed that 2012 reforms must maintain the current half-half balance between directly and indirectly elected legislators. But government officials and promoters have never adequately explained the origins of this District Councils plan, first seen in the government’s hastily prepared reform package of 2005. Pan-democratic legislators rejected the 2005 package but did not discuss the larger significance of the District Councils plan. Where did it come from? Whose idea was it in the first place? What are the precedents? Who is promoting it now? Who stands to benefit? And what does it mean for the ultimate aim of universal suffrage?

ORIGINS
The immediate origin of the current proposal can be traced to the government’s Green Paper on Constitutional Development issued in July 2007. This paper formally began the present political reform exercise in accordance with the new five-step procedure mandated by Beijing’s Basic Law “Interpretation” of April 2004.

The Green Paper presented three options whereby Legco could achieve the ultimate aim of universal suffrage elections as promised by the Basic Law. These were: (1) direct election of all Legco members by one-person-one-vote universal suffrage; (2) retaining the existing half-half balance with 30 directly elected and 30 FC legislators; or (3) allowing all 30 FC seats to be filled through indirect election by the members of Hong Kong’s 18 District Councils. According to the Green Paper, “all Legco seats will then be district-based seats returned through direct or indirect elections” (paragraph 4.14). This third option received no publicity in 2007 and the Green Paper cited only one submission in its Appendix recommending this option.
The option actually resurrects an arrangement designed by the colonial government in 1985 when for the first time ever elections, albeit this indirect variety, were introduced for a minority of Legco members. Until then the legislature was wholly appointed. Direct elections, for a minority of legislators, did not occur until 1991. Circumstances today, however, are very different.

PURPOSE
The 2007 Green Paper seemed to have included the District Councils option only as an afterthought. But of course it was not. Throughout the just-concluded consultation period for the 2012 reforms, official promoters steadfastly maintained that the government “did not have the authority” to reveal the direction their proposals might take beyond 2012. While they may not have the authority, officials evidently do have a tentative roadmap in mind, however, and it naturally entails the District Councils plan.
After the consultation exercise ended, Executive Councilor Anthony Cheung Bing-leung mentioned in passing (South China Morning Post, Feb. 19, 2010) that the government was planning to propose expanding the District Councils option for use in replacing the FCs, just as the Green Paper had indicated. During the consultation period, pro-Beijing Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong (DAB) supporters also referred in passing to such a future course if the experiment for five new Legislative Councilors indirectly elected by District Councilors proves successful.

PRECEDENTS
Nor does the lack of transparency end there. Equally important are the omissions when citing precedents to legitimize indirect elections. The Green Paper noted only that in international practice or “overseas jurisdictions,” universal suffrage one-person-one-vote systems “can take the form of direct or indirect election” (paragraph 2.24). At public consultation forums, supporters of the government’s 2012 proposals liked to cite various examples in Europe where Western democratic systems combine both direct and indirect elections. When speakers were reminded that Hong Kong is part of China not Europe, they had no answer.

Another favorite precedent was that old whipping boy, the United States’ presidential Electoral College, which was responsible for electing George W. Bush in 2000, even though Al Gore won more popular votes. When speakers were cautioned not to compare apples and oranges, again they did not respond. But for anyone familiar with the U.S. electoral system, the comparison seemed forced at best.

In that system, presidential candidates are first chosen in all 50 states through statewide primaries where everyone who wants to can either vote directly or make their preference known directly for the candidate of their choice. The nationwide direct popular vote follows. Only then does the Electoral College, made up of electors designated by voters specifically for the purpose, make a final decision. This can override the popular vote but rarely does. The Electoral College is also widely recognized s an anachronistic holdover from a less democratic past that reformers have tried repeatedly to abolish precisely because it undermines the legitimacy of the popular vote. By contrast, each Hong Kong District Councilor is elected to oversee neighborhood amenities by a few thousand voters from small fragmented constituencies, which do not even adequately represent the population within each of the 18 District Council catchment areas.

THE ONLY PRECEDENT THAT MATTERS
When asked specifically why they never cited Chinese precedents, democrats and government supporters alike could not see the relevance. Politicians and commentators who are aware of the mainland precedent that will be set by introducing the District Councils plan hesitate to say so openly for fear of heightening tensions further. In fact, for Hong Kong now, there is only one precedent that matters, namely, China’s People’s Congress system, which is the government structure through which the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) exercises its leadership.

Article 3 of the Chinese Constitution specifics that the: “National People’s Congress and the local people’s congresses at various levels are constituted through elections.” Articles 59 and 97 spell out the arrangements for these elections. National deputies and those to the people’s congresses of provinces and large cities are all elected indirectly by the congresses at the next lower level; deputies to congresses of counties, small cities, city districts, and townships “are elected directly by their constituencies.”Article 34 grants all Chinese citizens over the age of 18 the right to vote and to contest these elections.

The Hong Kong public knows and fears the mainland system of CCP-led dictatorship but has little knowledge about these electoral mechanisms and governing institutions through which that dictatorship is exercised nationwide. Even some leading members of Hong Kong democrats’ Universal Suffrage Alliance do not know that the small grassroots constituencies at the base of China’s People’s Congress pyramid directly elect local congresses and village committees on a one-person-one-vote basis. That CCP branches and leaders vet candidates and dominate the system from top to bottom is known or at least assumed. That 2.3 million Chinese citizens have been directly elected to over 600,000 village committees since 1988 is not known. Nor is its significance appreciated as the precedent for Hong Kong’s new District Councils plan.

WHO BENEFITS?
Clearly, the DAB with its 12,000+ membership and many district-level satellite groups would be the main beneficiary of the government’s District Councils plan. Recently, some democratic politicians have begun openly referring to the DAB as “the communist party” and they debate among themselves the wisdom of “outing” Hong Kong’s underground CCP branch. But its presence is an open secret as are its presumed leading members who overlap with those of the DAB. The latter is, in any case, modeled on the CCP as a mass-based hierarchical organization that is invariably loyal to Beijing’s policy decisions.

Unfortunately for pan-democrats, they cannot compete with the DAB at the District Council level where democratic strength has always been weakest. Even in the 1980s, when the District Councils were called District Boards, democratic activists found themselves at a disadvantage. Constituencies were not drawn district-wide but broken up into 400 small segments with each board member elected by only a few thousand voters form his/her immediate neighborhood. The boards were also concerned only with neighborhood amenities and a division-of-labor developed: conservatives dominated the District Councils while democrats set their sights higher at the Legislative Council level.

No one seems to have appreciated the political potential of this arrangement until the DAB realized how easily it could be exploited by simply building on the existing traditional street associations, charities, and neighborhood recreational facilities. Today these activities are supported by a dense array of well-funded conservative organizations and full-time paid DAB staffers in every district that under-funded and over-worked democrats can not hope to match.

Precise figures are difficult to calculate given the large number of independents, who are rarely independent of partisan inclinations. But in the last (2007) District Councils election, the DAB alone won more seats (115) than all the main democratic parties combined (93). Especially important in that election was the DAB’s strategy of coordinating its candidate lists and campaign platforms with like-minded groups that did not acknowledge their political affiliation while campaigning. They all, that is, the DAB and their allies, concentrated exclusively on livelihood issues leaving constituents unaware that they might be voting for the building blocks of a mainland-style people’s congress system.

WHAT IS UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE?
It follows that the main question everyone should be asking is: what does Beijing mean by universal suffrage? As indicated by Beijing’s latest (December 2007) decision on the matter, 2020 is the earliest date that Hong Kong can have a universal suffrage election for Legco. Everyone agrees that one-country-two-systems is a temporary arrangement designed to ease Hong Kong’s transition to full integration within China’s political system by 2047. In 2020, therefore, Hong Kong will be just about half way “home.”

If the District Councils plan proceeds as the government hopes, half of Legco will then be indirectly elected by District Councilors and Hong Kong will be on course to merge with the mainland People’s Congress system. Hong Kong will also have a form of “universal suffrage,” based like the mainland system today on a foundation of one-person-one-vote at the grassroots level. But if China is still governed under the same one-party system, and if the DAB is still organized in its present form, then the imposition of one-party CCP rule in Hong Kong will also be well on its way to realization by 2020.

If Hong Kong is satisfied with that prospect, then so be it. But if Hong Kong does not want to take such a risk with its future, then answers to all these questions should be demanded now, while there is still time to chart another course. The first step is to recognize the potential dangers of the District Councils option as currently proposed and explain them clearly to the public. Then, if their constituents agree, pan-democrats should refuse to accept the District Councils plan without substantial modification. But above all, the public should not be led blindly into a system the political implications of which have been clearly explained to only a select few “insiders.” The District Councils plan is actually a “People’s Congress plan” and should be known for what it is.


 

(Mar 29, 2009)

CONSULTING FOR DEMOCRACY:
GOVERNMENT PROPOSALS, PUBLIC RESPONSE
The government issued its latest set of political reform proposals last November and launched a three-month public consultation period that ended February 19th. Officially, the reforms are intended to further Hong Kong’s quest for the holy grail of directly-elected local government (Nov. 23/09 post). In reality, they seem like an exercise in political involution, designed to produce more circles of convoluted electoral activity without any change in the undemocratic executive-led system. Conservatives plus the main pro-Beijing political party, the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong (DAB), quickly endorsed the proposals. Their Alliance for Constitutional Development sponsored a petition bearing 1.6 million signatures collected on street corners all over town. The pan-democratic camp uniformly opposes the government’s reform package but not uniformly to the same degree in terms of response. This has divided into radical and moderate.

Radicals are represented by the most street-savvy of Hong Kong’s democratic parties, the League of Social Democrats (LSD), plus the lawyer-led Civic Party. In late January, five Legislative Councilors from these two parties, or one legislator from each of Hong Kong’s five legislative election districts, resigned their seats in order to precipitate territory-wide special elections that are being promoted as a de facto referendum on political reform. The by-elections, as they are called here, are scheduled for May 16th. These legislators say they will not endorse the government reform package without a roadmap, meaning some indication as to how the goal of genuine universal suffrage elections is to be achieved, which officials have so far refused to provide. The resignation/referendum exercise is intended as a gesture of protest, to focus public attention on the difference between what the government is offering and what democrats have always wanted.

Ironically, that leaves the older Democratic Party (DP) as chief power broker because it is the largest of the 11 political groups making up the new Universal Suffrage Alliance. This alignment is being called the moderate force within the democratic camp because none of its members wanted to take the risk of joining the resignation/referendum protest campaign. Until this division over tactics occurred, however, the DP contained some of Hong Kong’s most radical pan-democrats since DP leaders have been the mainstay of the Hong Kong Alliance in Support of the Patriotic Democratic Movement in China. That alliance sponsors Hong Kong’s annual candlelight vigil commemorating the 1989 crackdown in Tiananmen Square and continues to demand an end to one-party rule in China. Beijing regards this demand as a call for independence (from Chinese Communist Party rule) and therefore subject to the charge of treason. As a result, these leaders have had their “home-return” travel permits canceled, meaning they cannot cross the border for travel inland.

DP leaders also say they will not endorse the reform proposals without a roadmap: the Hong Kong government and Beijing authorities must give believable assurances that genuine one-person-one-vote direct elections are the aim by indicating specifically how that aim can be achieved. Although some members of the Universal Suffrage Alliance seem more ready than others to compromise, in reality the main difference between radicals and moderates is disagreement over the resignation/referendum protest tactic.

The split is nevertheless leading to some classic old-fashioned Chinese-style (also known as Machiavellian) stratagems. These naturally make for more interesting reading than the tedious details that distinguish various reform counter-proposals tabled by members of the public during the consultation period. But the strategizing has only just begun in earnest and should continue at least until May 16th. Meanwhile, the consultation exercise and counter-proposals it generated indicate the extent of public participation and the likely limits of public patience beyond which Beijing’s sought-after “harmonious” consensus will be difficult to achieve.

THE CONSULTATION EXERCISE
Hong Kongers have grown jaded over the years and are not enthusiastic participants in official consultations. The colonial government developed them into a formalistic art that is now used routinely for all kinds of public policy initiatives and the two officially-hosted open public forums followed accordingly. But Hong Kong’s long-running movement for universal suffrage elections is such a hot button issue that all politically active groups and several universities rose to the occasion by sponsoring their own public forums, petitions, opinion surveys, press conferences, and a multitude of other activities. The United States-funded National Democratic Institute co-sponsored a few of the open forums. Otherwise all were local civil society initiatives.

Due to various restrictions on the political use of television, it is the least effective medium for influencing public opinion, leaving that task to radio talk shows, the internet, online video programs, and social networking. Newspapers nevertheless remain the chief source of political news, information, opinion, and advertising. The main pro-democracy Chinese-language papers are Apple Daily [Pingguo ribao], Ming Pao Daily News [Mingbao], and Hsin Pao [Xinbao] known in English as the Hong Kong Economic Journal. Opposing all pan-democratic politicking on this issue are the main pro-Beijing papers: Wen Wei Po [Wenhui bao], Ta Kung Pao [Dagong bao], and China Daily.
The government’s Department of Constitutional and Mainland Affairs is now assessing the information gathered and will in due course publish collated statistics as well as a summary of the written submissions mailed in by the public, reportedly numbering 40,000. Due to past experience, however, this is the most vulnerable stage of the process in terms of generating public cynicism. It is also one reason why an up-or-down vote in a referendum freely and fairly conducted has long been a favored option among democrats -- if only five of their legislators did not have to resign in order to precipitate it.

THE PROPOSALS
To recap the government’s proposals: they were drafted in accordance with Beijing’s latest decision issued on Dec. 29, 2007. Universal suffrage elections cannot be introduced for the Chief Executive (CE) until 2017 and the Legislative Council (Legco) until 2020, at the earliest. But incremental adjustments toward that end can be made in elections along the way. The government’s current proposals concern only the next CE and Legco terms; elections for both will occur in 2012.

Currently, the CE is elected by an 800-member committee that is itself created by electors from four sectors, drawn to favor conservative business and pro-Beijing interests. The government proposes to increase the size of this committee from 800 to 1,200 members while retaining its existing design. For Legco, the government proposes an increase from 60 to 70 seats, with the addition of five seats to be filled by direct universal suffrage elections in the five geographic constituencies. The other five new seats would be filled by indirect election with members of Hong Kong’s 18 District Councils serving as electors. This would preserve the 50/50 balance in Legco between directly and indirectly elected members as mandated by Beijing’s December 2007 decision. No changes are proposed for the existing occupation-based Functional Constituencies (FCs), which replicate the CE Election Committee and are also designed to favor conservative interests. They elect 29 legislators; one is already indirectly chosen by District Councilors from among their own ranks.

Key to pan-democratic opposition is the lack of a roadmap beyond 2012 and the government has failed to explain this lapse. Officials say only that they lack authority to do so but without explanation except to cite Beijing’s December 2007 decision. Since that decision does permit incremental changes in anticipation of the 2017/2020 timetable, democrats remain skeptical about the sincerity of the universal suffrage promise itself.

Contributing to this skepticism is the demand of some high-profile conservatives to retain the FCs permanently.

Because they relate to constitutional reform, the government’s proposals cannot be implemented until approved by two-thirds of Legco’s 60 members, of whom 23 are democrats. But since democrats represent 60% of the popular vote (for the 30 directly-elected seats), the battle for public opinion is as important as the legislative vote count in order to ensure smooth passage from law into practice.

OPINION POLLS
Despite the hectic rounds of activity among pan-democrats, however, impressions drawn from the exercise so far do not bode particularly well for their cause. The Hong Kong government’s most constant resource dating back to colonial times has been the assumption of public apathy and ignorance about politics, electoral systems, and government institutions. That tradition is still being exploited for whatever advantage it can bring, as suggested by the results of preliminary polling.

Hong Kong University pollsters conducted three surveys asking how much people knew about the government’s reform proposals. In late November when the consultation began, 68% said they knew little; by early February shortly before it ended, the number was 70%. Given that response, the support/opposition questions probably signify little. But support for the Chief Executive electoral reform proposals fell slightly (from 43% to 41%); opposition remained steady (31%). Support for the Legco proposals fell slightly more (from 43% to 39%; opposition rose (from 28% to 32%).

A similar Chinese University poll conducted in late December found support for the government’s proposals at 50.8%; opposition, 30.6%; undecided, 18.6%. According to the pro-Beijing One-Country, Two-System Research Institute poll in late February, 56.3% supported the government’s proposals with 30.9% opposed and 12.7% undecided.

PETITIONS AND COUNTER-PROPOSALS
Hong Kong professionals and university academics had traditionally been conservative but a new generation is establishing itself. These younger university professors along with lawyers, school teachers, social workers, and journalists are now providing intellectual backup for the pan-democratic camp -- except on the resignation/referendum tactic. This has met with strong disapproval among academics especially. Foreign diplomats are also said to be uniformly against the idea, which should interest Beijing since officials there routinely blame foreign consulates here for aiding and abetting Hong Kong democrats.

Incidentally, the consultation exercise has been a boon for the Chinese-language press or at least its advertising revenues. Business supporters of the FCs can easily afford full-page spreads for their statements and petitions. Pro-democracy academics and others must be satisfied with more modest layouts (not to be confused with the two referendum parties themselves, which evidently have substantial advertising budgets). Among the self-financed petitions were two representing more and less moderate stands.

“A Word from Intellectuals on Hong Kong’s Future” contained 126 names and was sponsored by a dozen university academics including Chinese University political scientist MA Ngok who is lead researcher for the moderate Universal Suffrage Alliance. They say they “are tired of the endless political wrangling” and find the government’s reform package incapable of providing a solution. Toward that end their demands are:
(1) the central authorities in Beijing should explain that by 2017 the threshold for nominations within the CE Election Committee will be no higher than it is now (one-eighth of 800 members); (2) Beijing should explain that in 2020 universal suffrage will mean equal voting rights for everyone and no FCs; (3) under the proposal for indirect elections by District Councilors, the current practice whereby 20% of the 500 total are government appointees should be phased out and DC elections should be made more democratic to allow all parties balanced representation at that level.

The Professional Commons group, closely associated with the radicalized Civic Party, issued a stronger statement. Its 150 signatories called on Chief Executive Donald Tsang to withdraw the proposals and re-issue a new package designed to achieve “genuine universal suffrage with total abolition of the FCs.” An unusual advertisement from the entire legal community proclaimed the FCs to be incompatible with universal suffrage.

Academics have also tried their hand at designing alternative proposals and some of these ideas may contribute to final solutions should the authorities agree to negotiate. All these ideas suggest ways of redrawing and ultimately dismantling the FCs, which are seen as the main stumbling block to universal suffrage. In fact, it is Beijing that stands as the primary obstacle; the FCs are secondary. But some adjustments might be introduced in deference to the widespread perception that the current electoral arrangement gives unfair advantage to conservative business interests.

Based on his findings in that respect, Michael DeGolyer, who heads the survey research Transition Project at Baptist University, suggests broadening the composition of various FCs to include occupations not now represented. Eventually all occupations would be included thereby negating the need for FCs. Researchers led by Simon Young at Hong Kong University’s Center for Comparative and Public Law (CCPL) recommend the gradual merger and rearrangement of existing FCs in a way that will ultimately reduce the influence of those most resistant to giving up their electoral advantage. This would, by 2020, leave the remaining diehards with insufficient Legco votes to block their own abolition.

These plans pay little attention to the government’s new proposal to allow the indirect election of five legislators by District Councilors. University of Science and Technology professor, SING Ming, notes the inability of democratic candidates to compete equally and fairly in District Council elections due to their small constituencies and the generous conservative budgets that are being used to fund grassroots social services. He therefore recommends using the five territory-wide Legco election districts for the purpose of filling the five new seats and allowing universal suffrage for candidates who would presumably be nominated by District Councilors. This is part of his larger design that would, between now and 2020, combine the existing FCs into four sectors with suffrage gradually expanding in each sector until all were elected on a one-person-one-vote basis.

WHAT NEXT?
Academics and other sympathetic onlookers are denouncing the two-party referendum as a distraction from the serious business of negotiating an end to Hong Kong’s political reform deadlock. Some are even raising fears about a “tragedy” in the making with melodramatic visions of gangland politics and populism run riot. The resignation/referendum parties have contributed their share to rising tensions with an initial advertizing blitz that called on Hong Kongers to “rise up” and struggle against small-circle elections, a phrase immediately interpreted by Beijing as incitement to rebellion.

Atmospherics aside, however, there is much work yet to be done as indicated by the HKU poll that found 70% of its respondents claiming not to understand the issues discussed during the consultation period. Those respondents were actually saying something important and the referendum electioneering campaign will provide another opportunity to answer their questions. Hopefully that opportunity will not be wasted because there is still little understanding here about the political implications of different kinds of electoral systems or the institutions of government that go with them.

The public knows and fears the mainland system of Chinese Communist Party (CCP)-led dictatorship but has little knowledge about the mechanisms and institutions whereby that dictatorship is exercised nationwide. Even some leading members of the democrats’ Universal Suffrage Alliance do not know that the small grassroots constituencies at the base of China’s People’s Congress pyramid are directly elected on a one-person-one-vote basis. Higher level congresses are indirectly elected with CCP leaders at each level vetting candidates throughout.

The similarity with Hong Kong’s small District Council constituencies where only a few thousand voters elect each councilor is obvious. Yet not only is the practice of indirect election from the District Councils to Legco being promoted in the government’s reform proposals. The pro-Beijing DAB, which replicates the CCP as a mass-based hierarchically organized party and now has majorities on all but two of Hong Kong’s 18 District Councils, is advocating use of the “District Council model” as the roadmap to universal suffrage. Except for a few inadvertent slip-ups, however, this idea remained hidden from public view throughout the consultation exercise. Only after the exercise ended did one government official mention in passing that the government was indeed planning to propose expanding the District Council model for use in replacing the FCs.

Politicians and commentators who are aware of the mainland precedent that will be set by introducing the District Council model nevertheless hesitate to identify it as such for fear of heightening tensions further. Hence the larger political implications (of integration with the mainland People’s Congress system) are being ignored. Those few who discuss the model at all focus only on the unfair advantage it gives to “a certain party,” the public forum euphemism for the DAB and its many satellite groups.

Meanwhile, government officials and conservative promoters speak earnestly about all the international jurisdictions that combine universal suffrage with indirect elections, often even citing the example of the U.S. presidential Electoral College. Yet not a single commentator has mentioned the only precedent that matters, namely, China’s People’s Congress system. Article 3 of the Chinese Constitution specifies that the: “National People’s Congress and the local people’s congresses at various levels are constituted through democratic elections.” Articles 59 and 97 spell out the arrangements for these elections. National deputies and those to the people’s congresses of provinces and large cities are all elected indirectly by the congresses at the next lower level; deputies to congresses of counties, small cities, city districts, and townships “are elected directly by their constituencies.”

The respondents in HKU’s poll should be congratulated since they were clearheaded enough to understand and honest enough to admit that they did not know what the political reform proposals entailed.

 

(July 28, 2009)

July First: End of the Road or a New Beginning?
Now that the July First anniversary of Hong Kong’s return to Chinese sovereignty has been transformed into a day of competing partisan street demonstrations, all morning-after spin naturally follows in the same spirit. This year’s post-mortems have only been more intense than usual because they are not just burnishing memories for posterity but laying down markers and mobilizing support for the next round of Hong Kong’s never-ending political reform debate due to begin later this year. Toward this end, attention focused overwhelmingly on pan-democrats’ afternoon protest march and its political significance.
Disinterested observers accept neither the police estimate of only 28,000 participants nor the organizers’ 76,000 claim. Conventional wisdom says take a number in-between, which happens to dovetail nicely with my 50,000+ estimate based on the crowds gathered in the Victoria Park staging area (see previous post). But the need for a low official estimate became clear on the morning after when Hong Kong’s main pro-Beijing daily, the Wen Wei Po (pinyin: Wenhui bao; English: none) carried a rare full page account of the afternoon march topped by the banner headline proclaiming the lowest of all figures: “26,000 people march with at least 15 different complaints,” none of which were about political reform, universal suffrage, or better governance. Nine photographs pictured marchers with various livelihood demands; the tenth featured a group of loyalists from the morning parade denouncing democrats for disrupting social harmony and creating chaos everywhere.
If the public cannot be stopped from marching, then the next best thing is to minimize the impact and deny its political significance. The implications were clear to everyone else, however, which was why the lower than 100,000 expected turnout was so disappointing. Hong Kong has learned that the only thing capable of deflecting Beijing from its announced course is a really large crowd of people in the streets. The dreaded Article 23 national security legislation was deferred by this means in 2003, but that year’s mass protest also precipitated Beijing’s post-2003 ultimatums that have now delayed full universal suffrage elections until 2017 and 2020 at the earliest.
Nevertheless, democrats continue to put their faith in popular mass action and if one march disappoints, they say, call it a preliminary skirmish and try again. Apple Daily’s morning-after headline defiantly proclaimed the 76,000 turnout figure along with the pervasive marching chants against Chief Executive Donald Tsang and for universal suffrage. “To the streets at year’s end, for universal suffrage in 2012,” proclaimed another headline (July 3), reminding everyone that July First had been about marching for democracy and in preparation for more to come. The reference was to the next phase of the struggle due to begin later this year when Donald Tsang unveils the government’s interim political reform proposals.
Despite Beijing’s decisions to delay full universal suffrage elections for many years, interim adjustments can be made along the way. The next selection/election of the chief executive and legislature will be held in 2012 and in past years, before Beijing’s delaying decisions, democrats had called for full elections by that date. The slogan is now being used as a rallying cry reminder and standard for judging the proposals already rumored by loyalists to be “even more conservative” than a similar exercise rejected by democrats in 2005. The debate, in other words, will not be about full democratic elections in 2012 but only about which incremental adjustments seem the least likely to inhibit progress toward that end by the faraway elections of 2017 and 2020!
So tenuous an aim will naturally make mobilizing public interest all the more difficult, which is doubtless the reason for the endless delays in a goal that democrats have been pursuing like a desert mirage since the mid-1980s. Each time they seem to be nearing their destination, it then slips further back into the distance once more. But the coming incremental adjustments will actually mark a crucial precedent-setting step because once the way forward is fixed and formalized in this way, by a vote in the Legislative Council and with Beijing’s approval, significant design changes thereafter will be all the more difficult to achieve.
Other more moderate democratic voices offer a more sober assessment. Some government sources have said that only about 30,000 people are really committed to universal suffrage, editorialized the Chinese-language Ming Pao Daily News (July 3), noting that the figure just happened to match the carefully constructed conservative estimates of protest march participants. If this view of public opinion is reflected in the government’s coming reform proposals, concluded the editorial, and if they try to reverse course on democratization as a result, we can only wait to see how strong the public’s reaction will be. The conclusion was written more in hope than conviction.
Doubts obviously remain and these are carefully nurtured by conservative opinion polls that ask the perennial question about whether people care more about political reform than livelihood issues, a question that always receives the same response. One such poll, conducted by the Chinese University’s Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies soon after July First, found that those who did not march (94% of all 1,000 respondents) said economic development was their highest priority followed by several other non-political issues. And only 39% of those who did march said political reform and governance were major concerns for them. What’s more, just over 80% of all respondents said Hong Kong’s political system was already either very or generally democratic (http://www.cuhk.edu.hk/hkiaps/csp/press.html).
This survey may or may not be indicative of how public opinion will respond to the coming package of proposals. The government has been relying on these “political apathy” polls since the mid-1980s and policies have been based on their assumptions, with the most spectacular failure occurring in 2003. But democrats should heed the lessons of 2003 and also of 2005, when they voted down a conservative government reform without ever bothering to explain its long-term implications to the public. In contrast, the government’s 2003 publicity for its Article 23 legislation was also based on the assumption that its complex issues were beyond the comprehension or concern of “taxi drivers and McDonald’s staffers.” But after a slow start, democrats ran an effective public information campaign that spelled out clearly what the legislation would mean for everyone.
As of now, the Hong Kong public is lamentably ill-informed about the basic institutional features of the mainland’s party-led political system, and about the challenges these will pose as Hong Kong is slowly integrated within that system. Meanwhile, the local loyalist media is already building its polemic based on the official Beijing view of Western-style adversarial democracy as a colonial remnant antithetical to the Chinese way of governance, which is said to constitute a more appropriate form of universal suffrage-based people’s democracy. Ming Pao’s editorial writer was correct to suggest that the public will ultimately decide, and democrats know that “voting with their feet” is still the most effective means whereby Hong Kongers can express their opinion. But between now and year’s end, if they are to succeed, democrats will have to devise some ways of adapting the public’s generalized notions about dictatorship and democracy for practical use in assessing what will be a dry package of seemingly innocuous electoral reform proposals. Specifically, democrats will have to translate the dreary mesmerizing details of the government’s July 2007 Green Paper on Constitutional Development, which laid the foundations for the coming reform proposals, into a public information campaign that spells out the clear political implications both for this and later generations from now until 2047 and beyond.

(July 28, 2009)

Embarrassed by functional constituencies
Your Observer columnist Frank Ching (When rule of law is a matter of opinion, February 3), is absolutely right to take the government to task over its failure to acknowledge the need to bring Hong Kong's electoral system into full compliance with the terms of Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).

 Since the return of sovereignty, the Hong Kong SAR government has made two reports to the United Nations Human Rights Committee - the body responsible for monitoring the implementation of the terms of the ICCPR by its state parties.

 On each occasion the committee has reiterated the view that, now that an elected Legislative Council has been established in Hong Kong, elections to the council should conform to Article 25's requirement that elections be by universal and equal suffrage - a provision which effectively means that Legislative Council functional constituencies must be abolished in order for Hong Kong people to attain full universal suffrage.

 Given the authoritative status of the committee and the priority it rightly places on this important issue, it is both absurd and demeaning to Hong Kong people for our government to continue to hide behind an outdated reservation entered into by the previous colonial power in 1976 as an excuse for not fulfilling the central government's obligations under the Basic Law.

---- 載於2009年2月9日《South China Morning Post》

Bizarre claim on vote reform
I refer to Lau Nai-keung's Observer column (Civilised politics is the art of compromise, January 9).

I am sure many of your readers will have been puzzled by his assertion that, should China wish to apply to Hong Kong Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) - which requires that elections to government bodies be on the basis of universal and equal suffrage - it would have to apply the article to the entire country.

The fact is that, upon the resumption of sovereignty in 1997, the central government agreed to assume Britain's treaty obligations under the ICCPR and under Article 39 of the Basic Law, to apply them in Hong Kong through local laws.

Implementation of these obligations, to bring them fully in line with the requirements of Article 25, would therefore have absolutely no implications for the rest of China.

Since the return of sovereignty the Hong Kong SAR government has made two reports to the United Nations Human Rights Committee, which is the body responsible for monitoring the implementation of the terms of the ICCPR by its state parties.

On each occasion the committee has reiterated the view that now that an elected Legislative Council has been established in Hong Kong, elections to the council should conform to Article 25.

Given the authoritative status of the committee and the priority it rightly places on this important issue, it is hard to understand why our government does not want to put beyond doubt as soon as possible its full commitment to the internationally recognised definition of universal suffrage.

---- 載於2009年2月7日《South China Morning Post》

CAMPAIGNING FOR DEMOCRACY, BUT TOWARD WHAT END?
As everyone knows, voting is the most basic and important aspect of democracy. People vote and their choices matter. They determine who occupies the institutions that make decisions governing our lives. Of course, in Hong Kong’s executive-led system, elected representatives have limited powers in that respect. Hence we cannot speak in customary Western democratic terms of a contract between government and citizens that is confirmed and renewed regularly by a popular vote. Hong Kong has never had such a democratic system and it may never be governed in that way. But the Basic Law allows elected representatives some important powers nonetheless. Those to be exercised during the tenure of the 2008 Legislative Council will determine the design of Hong Kong’s constitutional evolution toward universal suffrage, as well as the all-important Article 23 legislation, which is reportedly to be re-introduced before Donald Tsang’s term of office ends in 2012.

Hence despite the political pessimism now widely prevalent, voting is still important and its most significant aspect is not just whether the electorate is able to express its will freely and fairly in terms of electoral rules and regulations. Even more crucial is whether voters have the ability to make informed choices. Since Hong Kong’s elections are well managed and the population well educated, the main question mark surrounding the ability to make informed choices concerns the specific political knowledge and information available to the electorate ahead of the coming Legislative Council poll. This is because no Legco election to date has been more important for Hong Kong’s political future, and none has been so poorly explained to the electorate. Public political discourse appears to have stagnated in Hong Kong around about 2004, even as the political system itself has continued to evolve under the more watchful eyes of Beijing officialdom. Yet if ever a political reality check was needed, it is now before voters head to the polls on September 7th. Best and worst case scenarios need to be spelled out and some creative fall-back alternatives presented if the worst befalls democratic candidates, which it very well might.

To be sure, not all the political players are blind to the issues at stake, but therein lies the danger. Hong Kong and Beijing government officials say openly that the new Legco will set the course for Hong Kong’s political evolution ever after. They also say why: because legislators must choose among competing proposals that will determine what kind of universal suffrage system Hong Kong can work toward between now and 2017-2020. Politicians and commentators note further that if pan-democrats lose the crucial 21-seat minority needed to block constitutional reform proposals, democrats will also have lost the ability to influence those decisions.

But there the public’s information essentially ends. Voters must either guess or intuit the rest because few seem to be aware of the attendant details, which have yet to appear in anyone’s campaign literature. It follows that if constituents are to be mobilized on their behalf, democrats need to instill a greater sense of urgency than is currently apparent. Toward that end, the public needs to be clear about the alternatives, which are obscured by the mesmerizing detail of the government’s Green Paper on Constitutional Development issued a year ago. They are also obscured by the failure of all parties to explain the long-term implications of the choices to be made.

LONG-TERM IMPLICATIONS

That the government should obfuscate the issues is understandable. Its job is to finesse Hong Kong’s political evolution by minimizing opposition and all pro-government parties behave accordingly. The reason for democrats’ failure is less obvious because most have not abandoned their commitments. Rather they seem simply to have lost their bearings in the transition from two systems to one, and so they are unable to shift gears even as the road turns and the necessity of adjusting become more urgent. Specifically, pan-democrats continue to think in terms of the one-country, two-systems past. In contrast, all government economic and political planning is future-oriented and clearly aimed at easing Hong Kong into the slipstream of one-country, one-system.

What does this mean in terms of local political discourse and campaign rhetoric? It means that democrats never discuss the endgame and never ask their opponents what Article 5 of the Basic Law means when it promises that Hong Kong’s “way-of-life” shall remain unchanged for 50 years. Way-of-life includes economic and social freedoms. But it also includes certain other customs that Hong Kong has always taken for granted. What will happen to judicial independence, the rule of law, and freedom of expression in all its many forms? These remain the most distinctive points of difference between the mainland and Hong Kong “systems.” Are pro-government candidates willing to address such questions? We do not know because they have never been asked, at least not in public.

These questions are especially urgent now because successful candidates in September will almost certainly be asked to consider the new Article 23 legislation before their terms end in 2012 and their views on the larger questions are important indicators of how they will scrutinize related bills. The original legislation contained many points contrary to Hong Kong’s customary freedoms and the public needs to know where candidates stand today on those same points.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL ALTERNATIVES

Given these long-term implications, candidates should also be discussing the political reform alternatives since the designs for Legco, to be voted on during the 2008-2012 term, will determine what kinds of legislators are seated there in all the years to come. In fact, the available alternatives have already been severely circumscribed by Beijing’s December 2007 decision that forbids universal suffrage elections for the Chief Executive and Legco until 2017 and 2020, respectively. Some clues are nevertheless provided in the government’s Green Paper on Constitutional Development and in the related strategic discussions.

Despite its obfuscation, the Green Paper actually spells out the options available to Hong Kong in very clear terms. The chief executive election is less problematic because the nominees must meet with Beijing’s prior approval, which has always been a foregone conclusion (GP: 2.08.ii; 3.40). More important now, during the current election campaign, are the alternatives spelled out for Legco’s evolution. Only two remain since universal suffrage elections for the whole chamber were ruled out until 2020 by Beijing’s December 2007 decision.

The two remaining choices are: either retain Functional Constituency seats; or increase the number of Legco seats indirectly-elected by District Councillors (GP: 4.09, ff.). There is currently only one such seat. The Green Paper proposals even advocate retaining some of the special-interest Functional Constituency seats as a permanent companion for universal suffrage, albeit without explaining the apparent contradiction. The proposal for indirectly-elected seats at least comes with the caveat that indirect elections are commonly regarded in overseas jurisdictions as a form of universal suffrage (GP: 2.24).

Many democrats favor this latter alternative, which was introduced as part of the government’s abortive 2005 political reform package. But advocates have yet to offer the public a full list of its pros and cons. In particular, it is difficult to see how democrats could benefit from this arrangement when they have, especially after the November 2007 District Councils election, lost what extra influence they had gained at that level in 2003. Elected representatives from pro-government parties including the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong (DAB), the Liberal Party, and Civic Force now hold solid majorities in all but two of Hong Kong’s 18 District Councils.

At this level, the pro-Beijing DAB has become the dominant force and it has been careful not to articulate its reasons for building so dense a grassroots network of connections, allies, and surrogates. Perhaps it is because if Legco were to be indirectly elected by District Councillors, the arrangement would put Hong Kong directly on course to join the mainland National Peoples’ Congress system. This is based on universal suffrage at the grassroots level, with indirect elections form there on up, with the all-pervasive Chinese Communist Party vetting candidates from top to bottom. In November 2007, all DAB candidates and allies ran on platforms that focused exclusively on livelihood issues and did not refer to anything political. Yet the result of their sweeping victories now place them in a position to reap a preponderance of political benefit from any reform based on the indirect election of Legco members by District Councillors. We can only hope that by September 7th, voters will be able to go to the polls with more of the details necessary to make informed choices than the electorate had at its disposal last November.

In Western-style democracies, the electoral process, political system, and institutions of government embody and guarantee the rights and freedoms held to be self-evident. That such a means-ends relationship is not clearly apparent to the electorate in Hong Kong is one of the dangers of its executive-led partially-elected system. That danger can only be deflected if candidates raise the alarm and voters heed the warning.

信報財經新聞 管治不離民望──從彭定康到曾蔭權 -- 王永平
根據香港大學的民意調查，曾特首在本年八月初的支持度評分為五十四點八分（以零至一百分評價，五十分代表一半半），依然在低位徘徊，顯示百多億元的紓解民困措施未能提升其民望。下次影響特首民望的大事會是十月的施政報告。

針對香港政府最高領導的民望評分，是從彭定康年代開始。回歸後，對特首的民望調查，每月進行兩次。結果公布時，若有顯著上落，都會成為傳媒焦點。上月曾特首視「民望如浮雲」，更引起不少議論。

這篇文章是從彭定康就任末代港督時開始，看看歷任香港領導如何處理民意，或在施政時和仕途上如何受其影響。

彭定康樹立開放形象

先談彭定康。他以政治為終身事業，來港前是英國保守黨主席，成功領導保守黨贏得大選，自己卻輸了議席。他來香港時主要任務是確保英國有體面及光榮地撤離這塊殖民地。

彭定康拒絕穿殖民地總督的禮服，他穿便服登陸皇后碼頭。他走入旺角和灣仔街頭，飲涼茶、吃蛋撻。他明白市民對回歸有恐懼，希望獲多些民主保障，所以他鑽基本法的空子，擴大功能團體投票人數。他被罵千古罪人，但因此卻增加了他的民望。他的小狗和兩位漂亮女兒，成為傳媒八卦話題。他成功塑造一個親民形象，令市民愛戴。

但彭定康不單懂「做騷」，他其實做了幾件對香港管治有貢獻的事；例如他出席立法會，接受議員提問；他宣讀每年的施政報告後，舉辦市民大會；他要求各政府部門制定服務承諾，讓市民衡量公共服務的優劣。他成功樹立政府向市民開放、問責的方針。上述舉措，成為回歸後特首不得不跟隨的動作。

彭定康當然明白派錢的重要性。他用盡一切辦法，令新機場及有關基建加速進行。他大幅增加社會福利開支，特別是綜援金，所以他的民望一直保持近六十分。他離任時，市民依依不捨。他每次回港探訪，都引起哄動。

現在香港人只記得董建華離任時的低民望，但他就任第一屆特首時，民望評分達六十五分，市民對他充滿期望。他以「共創香港新紀元」為題的第一份施政報告，充滿理想，董特首承諾「為我們自己，也為我們後代，建設一個文明、富庶、安定、民主、充滿生命力的香港。」　　董特首的雄圖大計，很快便受到嚴峻的現實衝擊。隨亞洲金融風暴、禽流感的爆發，內地出生子女居港權的爭議及釋法，董特首的民望評分在他上任後一年便跌低於六十分，有不少時期更跌破五十分。他在二○○二年初宣布競選連任時，評分回升至約五十四分，顯示不少市民仍然對他抱有希望。

董建華民望長期不振

但在民望不高的情況下，董特首的第二屆首份施政報告明顯地比上屆的報告務實得多。報告主題為「善用香港優勢，共同振興經濟」，推動經濟發展和解決政府財赤成為當前急務。在當時環境，這是順應民情的政策。

二○○三年初香港爆發沙士，令市民陷入極度恐懼、無助的局面，政府處理此危機的手法，受到批評。同時間，政府推動二十三條立法，更令不少人感到自由受到威脅，終於導致五十萬人在七月一日上街抗議。特首民望大幅下跌至三十五分。董特首在二○○五年離任時，評分約四十八分，可算是不孚民望的特首。

民望除外，董特首在任時，致力加強香港與內地的經貿及基建的協調和聯繫。香港與中央政府簽署ＣＥＰＡ，是他任內一項重要政績，為香港長遠發展作出貢獻。

其實董特首不是不重視民望，他在第二屆任期開始時便定期就政策議題或個別事件做民意調查，由中央政策組負責委託專業機構進行。但因為種種理由，包括個人性格，董特首的民望長期低落，二○○三年七月一日後更一蹶不振。他提前離任，民望不高恐怕是其中一個考慮因素。

經過董建華七年管治，市民渴望出現一個比較貼近民情的實務型領導。曾蔭權出身寒微，憑個人努力做出成績，是香港典型的成功故事。他競選第三屆特首時，難得有梁家傑參與，讓他不止高票當選，還以大幅度民望壓倒對手。他把小圈子選舉包裝成全民參與的遊戲，是一個非常成功的打造民望個案。

曾蔭權「信心」十足

雖然曾蔭權的競選口號是「我會做好呢份工」，但像其他從政人物，他希望有所作為。他當選特首時的評分高達六十分，因此，他充滿信心宣讀以「香港新方向」為題的首份施政報告。他用了三次「我有信心」，提出他的治港藍圖。在這份包含不少理想和願景的報告中，曾特首提出「三個堅持」：經濟發展、環境、文化保育和社會和諧。他的目標是令「香港既是國家最進步和諧的城市，也是享有優質生活的全球城市。」他建議十大建設，以期每年為香港經濟創造逾一千億元的增加值，同時創造額外的二十五萬個職位。他務實減稅承諾及推行十二年免費教育。這份報告受到市民歡迎，令特首民望維持在高水平。

今年初的財政預算以還富於民為主題，盡派千億盈餘（包括預留五百億元推動醫療改革），令財爺曾司長民望大幅飆升。而特首民望在五月時亦企穩六十五分。
隨市民不滿政府委任副局長及政治助理的處理手法，特首民望開始在今年六月下滑。雖然特首宣布一個令市民意料不到的逾百億元大手筆紓解民困措施，但因為豁免外傭稅的錯亂，效果未符理想，對提升民望沒有幫助。

最近梁展文事件顯示曾特首仍然有能力解決危機，但事件暴露了公務員體制及高級官員的不足之處，影響了市民一向尊重高級公務員的信心，同時，特首決定全面檢討離職公務員的再就業安排，亦會成為公眾非常關注及公務員非常敏感的議題。未來半年，香港的經濟情況、通脹問題在在影響特首民望，是對曾特首的最大考驗。

總結一句：在香港沒有普選的情況下，特首民望直接影響管治成效及個人仕途，是不爭的事實；過去如是，未來亦如是。


 

---- 載於2008年8月27日《信報財經新聞》

明報 我們的未來在你手 -- 郭榮鏗
近日在某立法會法律界別的電視辯論中，香港大學及城市大學法律系的系會領袖，向候選人提了不少問題。他們關心的焦點，都只是圍繞CEPA、律師的商機、法律畢業生的前途等等。

想起近日讀到不少關於年輕律師掙扎求存的報道，不難明白同學們為何那麼緊生計。但他們關心的，是否確實就只有這些？

同學們當初選擇投身法律界，是為了什麼？

我更想知道的，是他們對一些廣泛社會議題的看法，例如民主、釋法及香港的法治現。可惜，辯論結束後我沒機會與他們暢談。

我離開校園已差不多十年，不得不承認與時下法律系學生有點脫節，對他們的欲求與惶惑亦不甚了了。

是的，社會結構在改變，一紙執業文憑再不能夠保證一世平步青雲。要成功，我們得比上一代更努力。法律專業像其他行業一樣，無可避免地要面對二十一世紀的挑戰。

但無論如何，對前途的焦慮不應障礙咱們對公義與法治的堅持和追求。因為今日香港的真正挑戰，不是我們自身有多成功，而是整個社會有多進步。

試想想，法治是香港賴以成功的基石。沒有法治，我們的專業在香港甚至全中國還有什麼立足點？

二十一世紀的香港要成功，要發展知識型經濟，我們就必須在一個法治的氛圍下，鞏固公平、公開及民主的核心價值，讓社會百花齊放。

作為法律界的明日棟樑，同學們正身處一個要緊的關口。若你願意緊握這些核心價值，機會的大門永遠為你而開。關心個人的事業與前途不等於要漠視社會的利益。反之，個人榮辱往往受制於社會整體。你手握的，不僅是自己的未來，還有我們的未來。



 

---- 載於2008年8月25日《明報》

明報 立法會還是工會 -- 陳文敏
立法會法律界功能團體今年共有兩名候選人，吳靄儀與何君堯兩人的政綱迥異，其中的分別，帶出了功能團體界別選舉的核心問題。

吳靄儀的政綱強調良好管治，保障法治，審議法案，監察和制衡政府，推動政改，爭取真正的普選。何君堯的政綱則強調業界生計的利益，爭取政府撥予法律界更多資源，公平競爭得同時保障公平報酬，設立專業責任上限以減低高昂的專業彌償保費，檢討律師行以「有限責任合伙制」的形式運作，減低律師行索償風險，游說開放內地法律服務市場予香港律師。

驟眼看這份政綱，如果不知何君堯是在選立法會議員，還可能以為這是一份競選律師會會長的政綱！這其實是一個嚴肅的問題：究竟選立法會議員和選律師會會長是否應該有分別？作為一個專業團體的工會，維護業界利益是無可厚非的，但作為立法會議員，應當關注的不該是更闊大的如法治、社會公義等問題而非只是照顧業界利益？

法律界在立法會中佔一席，但我們要問，為何當初要在議會給法律界一席？直至上世紀七十年代末，立法局成員主要由政府任命，在委任時，政府盡量在社會各界揀選精英。

八十年代推行代議政制時，當時擔心一下子引入直選，立法局內可能因而失去不同專業的精英，而他們的專業知識和經驗對議會的順利運作至為重要，功能團體選舉便應運而生。一來這是一個從委任制到直選制的過渡安排，二來功能團體選舉的原意是要求選民選出他們界別中的精英參與立法和監察政府的工作，一定程度上延續委任社會精英的制度，功能團體選舉的設計從來不是在照顧該功能團體的業界利益。立法會的功能在於制定良好的法律，使法律能反映民意，並透過議會代表監察政府。可惜，選精英演變成選代表維護業界利益，選立法會變為選工會代表。這也是功能團體該被廢除的理由。



 

---- 載於2008年8月20日《明報》

明報 策略性投票禍福難料 -- 蔡子強
上周二，港大民意研究計劃最新的民調顯示，受訪市民中，表示不會按政團或候選人指示配票的，達六成四，較上屆多八個百分點。

所謂策略性投票（strategic voting），便是指選民情願犧牲了自己真實的投票意願，改為投票支持自己其實並非最為擁戴的候選人，以期取得更為理想的選舉結果。最簡單的例子，莫如是選民覺得自己原本最支持的候選人，或是「贏梗」或是「輸梗」，為了避免自己手中選票遭浪費掉，便改為投票支持另外一些形勢較為吃緊的候選人。在台灣選舉中，這便是所謂的「棄保效應」。

1995 年本港立法機關選舉採用單議席單票制，大多數選區是兩人對壘，擺在選民面前的選擇清楚明確，非此即彼，根本不需要考慮策略性投票。

「合則俱損，分反有利」但自從1998 年改了用比例代表制，每區有多張來自同一陣營、政治立場相近的參選名單，再加上採用了最大餘額法， 「合則俱損，分反有利」，如何能夠讓自己支持的陣營，有最多數目的名單選上，促使本港選民開始考慮策略性投票。最戲劇性的，莫如是上屆港島區的例子，選前民調顯示，余若薇和何秀蘭的名單，一直大幅領先民主黨楊森和李柱銘的名單，預計所得選票甚至遠超兩個議席所需，相反，民主黨的第二席（即李柱銘）卻告急。結果，投票日，《蘋果日報》的頭版，刊出這位「民主之父」告急的消息，最後出現「驚世大逆轉」，余的名單得票急跌，流失往民主黨的名單上，雖然李柱銘是保住了，但何秀蘭卻意外丟掉了議席。

政治學者通常都不會建議市民作策略性投票。事實上，選民根本缺乏充足的資訊去作出判斷，究竟哪位候選人正處於優勢，哪位劣勢；或哪人剛處於邊緣位置正在告急。選民充其量只是按報章刊登的民調結果，或候選人政黨作出諸如「民主告急」等救亡號召，來作出判斷。但民調結果會有偏差，而候選人的救亡號召更可能只是其策略、幌子，選民根據這些信息作出策略性投票，都有可能弄巧反拙，令到原本自己所支持的候選人，其勝算受損。

另一個問題是，即使這些信息在當下屬於正確，但當選民開始決定行使策略性投票後，圖象便開始遭到扭曲。策略性投票的弔詭是：太少人這樣投票，對選情根本幫助不大；太多人這樣做，卻可能弄巧反拙。但如何才算得上是適中，則往往是事後才可出到孔明。

上述何秀蘭意外「墮馬」是一個經典例子，另一個例子則是2000 年新界西，原本根據大學及政黨所作的民調均顯示，陳偉業在最初處於劣勢，與鄧兆棠爭奪最後一個議席，於是傳出其選情吃緊的消息，他亦馬不停蹄地四處向選民作出緊急呼籲。

但到了中期，可能因民主黨的支持者開始積極考慮把選票轉投給陳，以作救亡；亦可能因受不負責任的報道所累，便開始輪到傳出何俊仁選情吃緊的消息，何亦趕緊派發告急單張。到了投票日前數天，最後才輪到李永達，他遂匆忙派發告急單張，但可惜為時已晚，李永達告大熱倒灶。選情的三個起落，似乎都與選民的策略性投票行為有一定關係。

所以有時候問題並不是出於民調不準確，而是民調嘗試描述的，並不是一個被動、靜止的世界，選民反過來會按民調的結果來調整自己的投票決定，所以民調便陷入一個類似「測不準原理」的弔詭，民調專家的工作亦因此變得吃力不討好。

扭曲公眾意願的表達

學者不建議市民作策略性投票的另一原因，便是它會扭曲了公眾意願的表達，政黨及候選人的得票，再不能反映其政策及政治取向受選民認可的程度。舉個例，如果一位勞工界候選人的得票因策略性投票而減少，便可能使政府低估了公眾對集體談判權，及最低工資等政策的支持程度。

但規勸還規勸，筆者相信策略性投票在將來的選舉還是會不斷出現。就如最近，港島區，民主黨再次提出「1+1=4」，即「一票給民主黨，一票給公民黨」以奪四席的策略；公民黨新界東的候選名單便局部公開他們的民調結果，指該黨名單排名第二的曾國豐有力與民建聯名單排名第二的陳克勤一爭，但不提同區其他泛民候選人等，都有引導市民進行策略性投票的意圖。結果，也禍福難料了。



 

---- 載於2008年8月14日《明報》

明報 立會選舉是對政府表現的公投 -- 盧子健
立會選舉是對政府表現的公投

在香港，立法會選舉是一個奇妙現象。以地區分區直選來說，競爭不可謂不激烈，政治光譜上不同定位的政治力量都有代表參與。以上屆來說，投票率超過50%，不能算是冷淡。

但社會上的選舉氣氛很冷淡。傳媒鮮有以選舉新聞作為頭條，而有關選舉的新聞花絮成分與嚴肅成分差不多一樣多。親朋同事之間在茶餘飯後討論選舉的也不多。

民意調查顯示，很多選民被問到為什麼投票時，大多數都表示是履行公民責任。而被問及依據什麼標準投票時，只有少數選民表示會考慮候選人的黨派背景，大多數選民表示會考慮他們的政綱。不過，立法會候選人的政綱大同小異。如果真的是參考政綱來投票，恐怕選民很難抉擇。我也懷疑有多少選民真的花時間閱讀候選人的政綱。

很明顯，市民對立法會的選舉是缺乏熱情的，面對民意調查他們亦只提供「行貨式」的答案。

立會民意基礎大，但權力小特首民意基礎小，但權力大這不能怪市民。因為他們面對一個不民主的政治制度和減少議員問責性的選舉方法。

市民一人一票選出的議員，只佔立法會60 個選席的一半，其餘一半是由小圈子的功能團體產生。今年小圈子功能團體選舉的其中13 個議席已經因為沒有競爭而自動產生了議員。小圈子內的「特殊」選民的權利其實也沒有什麼保障，隨時因為有影響力的大集團「傾掂數」而被取消。

立法會雖擁有百多萬投票選民的民意基礎，但權力有限。立法會不會產生政府，而且權力比選民基礎小得多的特首及其政府小得多。立法會幾乎沒有權力自行立法、或者通過撥款。而在分組點票的制約下，即使在比較有代表性的地區直選議員間有多數支持，有很多只是表態的議案亦未能通過，要成立專責調查委員會或者運用特權法來逼令政府做些什麼事便難若登天。

於是，立法會變成一個鬥嘴的場所，但鬥完嘴後似乎一事無成。如果有些什麼重大法案或者撥款得到立法會通過，其提議必定是來自政府，榮耀亦會歸於政府。

立法會要能贏取民望，便只能依靠堵截政府的不良法例或者不當的花費，又或者利用議事堂的空間，查找政府施政不足，揭示施政弊端，從而保障公眾利益。

我曾在本欄撰文說：所有立法會議員都是「反對派」，正是因為上述制度使然。不過這種說法也不是完全準確。

自從董建華年代開始搞「執政聯盟」，以及曾蔭權提出「親疏有別」後，路人皆見立法會內有幾股主要的親政府力量。不滿他們的人稱呼他們為「保皇黨」，傳媒近年採用較中性的名字「建制派」，也算是一個恰當的形容詞。

「建制派」的對立面是民主派，或者近年被傳媒慣稱為「泛民主派」，甚至簡稱「泛民」。有趣的是， 「泛民」的主流力量都拒絕「反對派」這個稱謂，以免被人誤會他們是「有破壞、冇建設」。

其實在目前不民主的政制下， 「泛民」做「反對派」沒有什麼不好，而這亦是可見將來的現實，除非「泛民」幻想自己有機會在小圈子選舉中獲取政治權力。這種情只有兩種發生的可能性，或者是中國大陸變天，本身走向民主化。如果真的有這可喜發現的話，香港自然會有雙普選， 「泛民」應該堂堂正正通過普選上台執政。

否則，就是「泛民」變節，不再堅持民主政制，以放棄原則來交換政治權力。果如此的話， 「泛民」就只是一個名稱，再不能算是民主派。

監察政府首要提高議政水平切忌「係又鬧、唔係又鬧」因此，如果「泛民」頭腦清醒，就應該明白他們在選舉中的得失，最重要的決定因素不是他們有什麼政策倡議，而是選民是否滿意政府的表現，是否認為需要支持「泛民」對政府進行較強力的監察。

其實在外國的民主政體內，即使會有執政黨的輪替，很多時選舉結果的決定性因素也是政府的民望。如果一個政府有高民望，反對黨難以在選舉中勝出。

上述說法是香港立法會選舉的基本形態，但也是簡單化了的描述。首先， 「泛民」自己是否善於引導選民以此作為投票的基本考慮，會影響這個基本形態的主導程度。因為畢竟在選舉中還有其他影響結果的因素，例如候選人質素、選舉工程、宣傳技巧等。但「泛民」若能成功定位，立法會選舉為對政府表現的公投，就能把選舉主軸擺放到自己較有優勢的戰場上。

其次， 「泛民」監察政府的水平有多高，會影響選民支持他們的熱情。我相信選民不介意「泛民」做反對派，他們亦會明白「泛民」的建設能力有限，但他們未必滿意「泛民」「係又鬧、唔係又鬧」。這涉及「泛民」的議政水平，而不是是否反對政府的問題。

總的來說，立會選舉是選民對政府表現表態的機會。

政府表現不佳，而「泛民」又能成功令到選民重視這個機會，他們的選舉就能有較佳成績，但倘若他們過去幾年在監察政府方面本身表現亦不佳，就難以掀動選民的熱情。



 

---- 載於2008年8月13日《明報》

民調的力量 -- 杜良謀
民調可以是配票的依據，也可以是拉票的策略，當獨立議員陳方安生呼籲選民，別在票站調查披露投票意向讓建制派配票，損害泛民利益時；泛民也有借助民調的力量，以顯示有力問鼎多一個議席。

公民黨新東參選人湯家驊便指出，委託港大民意研究中心有關新東的民調顯示，其團隊排第二的曾國豐有力與民建聯排第二的陳克勤競爭該區最後一席，但只講民建聯劉江華及陳克勤，分別獲百分之二十及一點五；公民黨湯家驊及曾國豐，則分別獲百分之十八點三及零點六。

「公道湯」說，由於上屆第七席由民建聯排第二的李國英，以百分之七點九的票數獲選，自己團隊現時的支持度接近兩成，減去一席所需的約百分之十四，仍有機會為曾國豐爭最後一席，再加上調查發現兩成選民仍未表態，若催谷至兩成三的支持度，爭奪末席便有希望。

對於不提其他泛民團隊如民主黨鄭家富，及另一勁敵自由黨田北俊也可能可以問鼎兩席，湯家驊解釋他們的假想敵只是民建聯，不視泛民其他參選名為對手，也不會說別人沒有勝算。

中大政治及行政學系高級導師蔡子強表示，此類說法並不新鮮，很多參選人都標榜說自己有望爭最後一席，目的是要突出自己，令選民感到他只差一些票便勝出，這亦反映目前選舉缺乏議題。但他認為只公布民調結果的一部分而作出某些分析，會出現扭曲及偏差，以新界東來說，可能第七席並非一定是曾國豐與陳克勤之爭

有政黨中人就分析，公民黨湯家驊、民主黨鄭家富、前劉慧卿、自由黨田北俊、民建聯劉江華五人較穩陣，第六、七席很可能是民主黨黃成智、社民連梁國雄、民建聯陳克勤等競逐。其他參選人還有蕭思江、李子榮和龐愛蘭。


 

---- 載於2008年8月5日《星島日報 》

公民乃民主之本 --郭榮鏗
上周日，一批沙田居民邀請我出席區內一個大型屋的居民大會，擔任義務律師。居民不滿法團經年累月管理不善，決定出來「起義」，打破悶局。

很難想像，一個炎熱的星期天，上千個居民擠在某學校的小禮堂裏，只為選出法團的新成員。這場選舉可不比任何大選遜色。會場外身穿彩衣的候選人，向居民派發政綱，助選團的吶喊聲此起彼落。時候到了，大家魚貫進場投下神聖一票。

19 世紀的法國哲學家托克維爾（Alexis deTocqueville）說過，要推行民主，除了要有法治，還必須有成熟的公民社會。一個完善的民主制度，必須由積極的公民組成。

公民責任，該從基本生活入手。若你關心住所的問題，就應挺身而出參選管理委員會；若你在乎屏風樓對居住環境的影響，大可組織關注小組，游說有關部門否決某些工程；若你緊子女的教育，最直接了當就是組織家長聯盟，告訴校方你們的想法。

過去十年，我們得見香港的公民社會茁壯成長，無論是民間團體或是政經智庫，香港人都意識到參與政治並非精英的專利。公民參與提升了社會的論政水平。

在香港，政制改革爭拗已持續廿多年。要真正為普選準備，最關鍵的不是獨沽一味的制度變革，而是培養公民意識，否則再完美的民主制度也只是軀殼，不能帶來我們應得的良好管治。在9 月的立法會選舉中，市民期望看到的，是一個有理念、有政策的政黨，而不是只顧「搞」選舉工程的投機集團。

衷心祝願新一屆業主立案法團的沙田居民，為鄰里建造一個更美好的生活環境。你的參與，是香港公民社會進程的重要一步。


 

---- 載於2008年8月4日《明報》

談票值扭曲率 --程介南
9月立法會選舉的提名期，今天是最後一天。正如我先前說過，今屆的參選人數，極可能破歷史紀錄。香港立法會選舉採用的是比例代表制，簡單而言，即當選議席的分配比例，是根據得票比例而定，而投票時候是投名單票而不是單獨個人票。有學者評論認為，在比例代表制中，如果參選人數/名單太多，實際上成了變相的多議席單票制。

缺點在少少票也能當選

以目前九龍西選區的情況來看，議席共有五個，但已經報名名單達到了11個。按比例算，五個議席平均必須要獲得20%的選票才能當選，那麼競逐最後剩餘席者，會因為參選人數眾多而只需要極少的得票比例， 例如7%，甚至更少，就可以當選。於是，一個以7%得票當選，一個以20%得票當選，這裏面是否有不公平存在？

這裏面的學問稱之為「票值扭曲率」。學者們的評論焦點也在於此，但其實不同的選舉投票模式，都各有其票值扭曲，只能是在權衡模式是否是和社會狀況的同時，掂量其扭曲程度而已。

學者們提到的多議席單票制，其缺點正在於「憑少少票都可以當選」。因為假如有兩個席位，候選人有10個，如果頭一名當選者得到90%的選票，那麼另一個當選者也就只有頂多10%的得票。粗看與比例代表制相比，後者是「得多少比例票就得多少比例議席」，扭曲比較小，但是如果參加的候選人愈多，出現票制扭曲的可能就愈大。

單議席單票制也會扭曲

那麼，是否另一種「廣為採用」的單議席單票制，即香港區議會選舉所採用者，就最公道呢？首先，其實比例代表制並不冷門，起碼在歐洲就的確是「廣為採用」。再者，單議席單票制其實也有票制扭曲！

一般而言，單議席單票制是簡單多數取決，既清楚又簡易，過去有人反對比例代表制的時候，還將單議席單票制說成是「最民主」的模式。然而正因為是簡單多數取決，於是隨時會出現僅以一票之差落選的局面。那就意味49.9%的選民意向會被否決。

如果這是選出執政者問題還不大，但若選議會民意代表的話，30個議席每個議席只輸一票，總數輸30票但就一席也得不到，這票值扭曲簡直是嚇人了。


 

---- 載於2008年8月1日《新報》

中層萎縮：褪色中的機會之都 --高德禮
從「獅子山下」到「香港故事」，特區政府拋出一個接一個港人奮鬥故事，教人相信香港真是一個「機會之都」。當中叫人印象深刻的要算是律政司司長黃仁龍的經歷，幾十年前他的父親靠當賣雪糕的流動小販把子女養育成才，成為城中佳話。但是根據「公共專業聯盟」的最新研究【註】，近年社會經濟環境的改變，加上政治權力向少數利益階層傾斜，社會向上流動的機會大不如前，更出現中層萎縮的現象。

無論從客觀統計或主觀的市民自我評價，都可以印證特區成立以來中層階級萎縮的現象。政府統計處二○○七年初公布的數字顯示：貧困階層愈形擴大，中等收入階層相對萎縮。月入少於一萬元住戶數目由一九九六的四十四萬戶增至二○○六年的六十二萬戶，由佔整體住戶的百分之二十四增至百分之二十八。月入一萬至四萬元的中等收入階層住戶，則由百分之六十一下跌至百分之五十五。

民主停滯政策傾斜

本港幾間大學合作進行的「香港的社會指標研究」顯示，在二○○六年，認為自己屬於中層階級的受訪者佔總受訪者的比例較一九九七年減少了百分之十點七，認為自己屬於下層階級的受訪者的比例卻增加了百分之十點三。

中層階級萎縮是過去十一年的長期趨勢，難以利用經濟周期的起落全部解釋，因此必須細看影響社會流動的結構性因素。中層階級萎縮是由於兩個因素交錯促成：中等收入階層向下流動大於向上流動；低收入階層向上流動緩慢，速度落後於整體增長的輻度。

由於特區成立以來民主政制的發展停滯不前，基層聲音長期積弱，難以扭轉公共政策的傾斜，低下階層向上社會流動的途徑一直受到窒礙。種種跡象顯示，副學士學生、低學歷青年人、新來港人士及少數族裔人士較難向上流動，原因包括：　　‧副學士學費負擔過高：兩年學費及生活費支出約十六萬元，畢業生月薪平均九千餘元，償還貸款相當吃力，中產家庭承擔有關支出也左支右絀；　　‧學校教育偏向「學術主導」，未能培養學術能力較差青年在體育藝術方面的潛能；　　‧新來港人士、少數族裔面對語言溝通障礙及適應困難，就業學業均受不良影響；　　‧中小企發展受政府「管理至上」思維所限制：公屋商場受大型店鋪主導、小販被片面取締等。

公平回報，才符合社會公義；社會流動，人民才有希望。中層階級萎縮，只會增加管治風險。要有效促進社會流動，特區政府須要在各方面的政策作出全面檢討，但以下兩項原則可作為基本方向：一、減輕個人及家庭教育負擔，俾能累積財富；二、提供有利中小企營商的環境，讓低學歷人士有機會創業致富。值得考慮的具體措施很多，可以先從教育政策、新來港人士政策和中小企政策三方面入手。
通脹重臨風險驟增

在教育政策方面，可以採取短期措施以舒緩副學士的經濟壓力，包括豁免利息，及向不獲發助學金副學士學生的家長提供子女專上教育免稅額；長遠而言則應檢討副學士教育資助政策。

為學術能力欠佳學生開拓一條就業途徑，中小學教育宜把「一人一體一藝」納入正規課程，培養學生的多元潛能，讓他們擔任演藝體育教練導師。為了減低少數族裔向上流動的障礙，教育局須為非華語學生制訂「中文作為第二語言」的中文語文教育政策，為他們度身訂造一套中文課程，並輔以按學生中文能力「分班分級」的彈性編班制度，以照顧學生語文能力的差異。

在新來港人士政策方面，政府可以安排專責機構系統地跟進個別新來港人士抵港初期的適應情況，並為所有成年來港定居人士提供語言訓練及適應課程。

在中小企政策方面，為了讓低學歷低技術人士有機會營商致富，特區政府應糾正把「方便管理」放在第一位的管理主義。例如，房委會可調整公營屋商場租賃及店鋪組合的策略，提供較多面積較小的商鋪單位，及恢復設置濕貨食品街市。小販政策宜適度放寬，在新界地區增發小販牌照，在屋範圍內劃定小販認可區。訂立公平競爭法，以擴大中小企的生存空間，更是刻不容緩。

過去十一年本港經濟每年均錄得增長，其中七年更超過百分之五，遠高於國際上其他成熟的經濟體系，但低收入家庭總數卻激增了四成。曾特首卻對這個警號充耳不聞，反而陶醉於「民望如浮雲」的虛幻境界。在通脹大潮的衝擊之下，中層萎縮的社會風險已經迫在眉睫。


 

---- 載於2008年7月30日《信報財經新聞》

從浮雲回歸香港政治深層 --陳健民 馬嶽
特首民望在副局長和政治助理任命事件後一直在低位徘徊。政府用110 億元派糖也像派興奮劑，只能換來民望短暫的回升。曾蔭權說民望於他是浮雲，只令人覺得他躺在雲端對民意輕蔑。一個承諾「以民為本」的政府在民怨沸騰中，應要反躬自省政策何處出錯，那豈是個人得失的問題？

政治任命一事弄得風風雨雨，自然是多重錯誤交疊出現的結果。第一是政府從來沒有詳細向社會解說擴大任命層的原因、任命準則和機制，而泛民批評之聲卻不絕於耳。第二、任命的機制既沒規範，加上各種政治勢力伸手「分豬肉」，出來的名單無論在人選的理念和能力都有較大的差異，政府就更難自圓其說政治任命的理念。第三是人選不少缺乏政治經驗，又不能說服公眾他們有長遠的政治承擔，與任命制的原意相違。有關持外國護照的爭論，或許並非港人愛國心膨脹，更多的是質疑新貴們的社會承擔。第四是政府低估民怨的強烈，不單是老百姓每天在超市格價，對政府高薪聘請年輕助理份外肉痛，更重要的是政府處理事件的手法違反了香港的核心價值，特別市民對政府辦事要公開透明、用人唯才的要求。

民意浮動政治盟友異常「縮骨」董去曾來，政府謹言慎行，經濟初步復蘇，無疑是穩定了政治局面，但許多政治深層的結構問題其實仍未疏解。只要特區政府嘗試創新而涉足爭議的領域，便會頓然發覺民意非常浮動、政治盟友異常「縮骨」、媒體跟市民情緒對政府一沉百踩。這種亂象自然是源於先進的社會與落後的政治體制的張力，政府嘗試以公關取替民主和制度改革，以「馬房」和短暫利益交換代替執政黨的建設，最終仍是徒勞無功。

這種深層的政治問題在2001 和2007 年兩次「亞洲民主動態研究」1（Asian Barometer）有關香港的調查中清楚呈現。在這有關民主評價和政治態度的跨國研究中，香港人對香港的法治、政府廉潔和自由的評價，都在亞洲區名列前茅，間接令不少香港人覺得民主政制並非迫切。但同時，香港市民不見得特別願意投入公共生活，參與政治。市民對政府雖不是十分猜疑，但冷眼旁觀，指指點點，是最佳寫照。

2007 年的調查發現，有40%的受訪者認為立法會選舉沒有真正的選擇，45%持相反意見，15%不能下判斷。這種分歧的觀點當然與我們仍保留半數功能議席有關。因此，市民在評價香港選舉是否公正時，只有13.3%認為很公正，65%認為基本公正但仍帶有或大或小的問題。更甚的是有高達62%的市民認為他們沒有權力去轉換一個他們不喜歡的政府。

相對大部分亞洲國家，港人的「政治無力感」是數一數二的，2而政府對民意的回應亦評價不高。調查發現有21.6%市民認為政府透明度經常不足、46%認為有時不足，只有17%滿意。對於政府施政是否能對應市民的需要，亦即所謂「福為民開」，市民出現分歧。43.6%認為政府做得到，近半人卻持負面態度。在亞洲屬中等水平，接近印尼和泰國。而當問及政府是否能回應社會上最嚴峻的問題時，香港馬上跌到亞洲的低水平，與台灣和菲律賓相近。

港人「政治無力感」亞洲數一數二制度的閉塞，令港人覺得參與政治是浪費時間。

除了投票以外，港人極少參與競選活動，只有1.6%市民參與過競選集會，1.5%參與助選工作。雖然有四成多市民每天留意政治新聞，2007 年調查發現只有24%的受訪者說對政治有興趣，比2001 年只多了6.4%。而認為自己有能力參與政治的，2007 年調查中只有10.4%，相對2001 年的3.9%雖有增加，但在亞洲區仍屬於最低水平。可見七一效應並不顯著，市民大多未因董建華下台與擱置23 條立法便感到人民力量的提升。

這種無力感和與政府的疏離當然不是說民主化便能解決。在民主化的同時，政府必須要增加透明度，提升回應社會需要的能力，和對社會的核心價值有敏銳的觸覺。曾特首如果對當前香港這些深層政治問題沒有透徹的認識，真不知他如何在未來2012 政改、醫療融資、西九發展和公平競爭法等幾場戰役中，靠袋內的小錦囊便能擺平矛盾。希望他及早從雲端回到民間，認真改革。


 

---- 載於2008年7月28日《明報》

民主政治就是自作自受 --胡忠信
民主政治能造就邱吉爾、戴高樂式的英雄典範，但也可能出現平凡無奇的領袖。這就是民主政治，它一方面有政黨輪替、任期限制的偉大設計，但也要容忍平庸、無能的人透過選舉制度當選的領導人。民主政治也是自作自受，人民既然做了決定，就要承受一切。馬英九上任才兩個月，民調支持度就打了對折，連中間選民都跑掉一半，馬英九能不深自惕勵、找出方法來嗎？否則未來三年十個月怎麼度過？

英國前首相邱吉爾帶領英國度過二戰危機，戰爭一結束，選民就拋棄了他，因為回歸承平時代，已不需要戰時領袖，邱吉爾自我解嘲地說：「酒店關門我就走。」並引用希臘哲人名言：「一個偉大的民族，對其領袖是無情的。」

法國前總統戴高樂也面臨相同的命運，他成立「自由法國」抵抗納粹，戰後短暫執政後就下野，沉潛了十二年，迄阿爾及利亞危機才復出，戴高樂吸取歷史教訓再造第五共和，建立堅強中央政府體制，但一九六八年學運再起，戴高樂找一個理由公投下野，從此退出政壇，人民對這位英雄兩度展現絕情。

陳水扁將民主資產揮霍一空

自一九四九年以來，台灣政治呈現非常獨特的發展模式，蔣介石的獨裁體制，基本上與二十世紀上半葉的北洋軍閥或歐洲法西斯主義沒有兩樣。蔣經國承襲此體制，卻遇上了民主政治的萌芽，經過了多番較量以後，蔣經國眼看「大江東流擋不住」，最後是開放黨禁，為全面民主化開路，蔣經國也因此奠定了歷史地位。

李登輝、陳水扁都是土生土長的台灣人，民主化與本土化同時推動，李登輝博得「民主先生」名號，但也留下「黑金政治」後遺症。陳水扁是最沒有包袱施行政治改革者，但他自我中心又見識有限，八年執政下來將民粹政治操弄到極限，陳水扁不但將民主運動的資產揮霍一空，還留下「貪腐、無能、惡搞」的形象，留待司法或歷史家一一加以決算。 馬英九打破了「外省人不可能當選台灣總統」的魔咒，以58%超高票當選「總統」，國民黨又掌控了四分之三立委多數，馬英九比李、陳兩位前任「總統」有更多優勢進行深化改革。但是，馬英九「為當總統而當總統」，既沒有明確的政治願景，又沒有強而有力的執行力，上任兩個月以來，性格弱點就暴露無遺，所有的民調無不顯示，對馬英九的「不滿意度」已超過「滿意度」，支持度也只有三成多而已，而中間選民的「不滿意度」由10%飆高到50%左右。光從上述令人怵目驚心的數據就顯示，民意已對馬英九強烈不滿，如同韓國的「李明博效應」，馬英九的領導力、執行力亮起紅燈，甚至衝擊到公信力。

馬性格弱點 浪費大好形勢

以七月中旬重創台灣中南部的卡玫基颱風為例，就把台灣的治水執行力作了徹底的檢視，花了八年一千一百六十億元的治水特別預算等於行同具文，一點都看不出成效。要求才上任兩個月的馬英九政府承擔一切責任固然沒有道理，但如同一個月前的釣魚台爭議，為什麼不見台灣救災體系做出因應措施？為什麼政府當局老是慢了半拍？何以雨災當天早上，馬英九還安排做健康檢查？無怪乎受災人民把怨氣出到巡視的官員身上。經濟不景氣加上天災人禍，對馬英九的形象造成重創。

以邱吉爾、戴高樂的歷史功業，人民都對這兩位領袖展現無情的一面。馬英九並無歷史功業，他只是蔣經國、李登輝執政時代所培養的菁英，站到了有利的位置，加上之前有陳水扁做為「負面表列」，兩相對照之下，陳水扁的「貪腐」強化了馬英九的「清廉」，陳水扁的「惡搞」凸顯了馬英九的「守成」，陳水扁的「強硬激烈」襯托了馬英九的「無所作為」，這種對比對馬英九的形象與選舉大為有利，但執政一上路，就面臨了赤裸裸、毫無閃躲空間的殘酷考驗。

以「經濟總舵手」蕭萬長為例，選前「馬蕭配」形成加乘效果，證明民意望治心切，「九萬兆」成為亮麗的希望與口號，三月二十三日迄五月二十日，社會充滿樂觀的願景與期待。但五二○執政後，蕭萬長就成為「沒有聲音的人」，成為徹徹底底的「藏鏡人」，不見任何意見的表態。「經濟總舵手」尚且如此，更何況菁英人才是否能為馬英九所用？馬英九的決策思維以及決策圈子又是怎麼一回事？
媒體批判由扁轉移到馬身上

公元兩千年以來經過兩次政黨輪替，加上朝野的無限上綱對決，以及媒體「第四權」的不斷擴大，人民是比過去任何時刻更嚴格且更挑剔的看待政治人物，電視政論節目對政治人物的批判，對人民的思考方式產生潛移默化影響，對陳水扁的嚴格批判，必然地轉移到馬英九身上。馬英九上任才兩個月就落到50%左右的「不滿意度」，每兩人就有一人對馬英九不滿，則是民主政治與「媒體洗禮」所必然造成的後果。

民主政治能造就邱吉爾、戴高樂式的英雄典範，但也有平凡無奇的薩柯齊、小布什、福田康夫；哪怕很有可能當選下任美國總統的奧巴馬，完全沒有治理國政及外交經驗，也沒有人敢打包票奧巴馬是不是能幹、出色的總統。這就是民主政治，它一方面有政黨輪替、任期限制的偉大設計，但也要容忍平庸、無能的人透過選舉制度當選的領導人。民主政治也是自作自受，人民既然做了決定，就要概括承受一切，哪怕有怨言也要往肚裡吞。

回過頭來講，馬英九上任才兩個月，民調支持度就打了對折，連中間選民都跑掉一半，馬英九能不深自惕勵、找出方法來嗎？否則未來三年十個月怎麼度過？


 

---- 載於2008年7月25日《文匯報》

成語新解 --李柱銘
「所謂『親』，是親近市民，以市民利益為優先；所謂『疏』，是疏遠市民，從政者以自己政治利益為優先。」——曾蔭權，二○○ 八年七月十六日曾特首於上周的答問大會，就「親疏有別」另訂解釋，但他會否言出必行呢？相信稍為留意時事的人都會有保留。因為一直以來，無論是公職任命、勳銜，以至挑選聖火傳送的選手，政府總是特別重用親政府人士，而民主派則鮮有獲得政府的賞識。然而，大部分港人親近，以及認為能代表市民利益的，卻是遭政府冷待的民主派。由此看來，曾特首豈不是只能做到其口中的「疏」？

事實上，曾特首已在答問大會親自表現出，他未能「親近市民，以市民利益為優先」。

筆者曾多次要求政府，期望高官們能身體力行響應政府的環保政策，在炎夏改以輕便衣著示人，從而將「室溫25.5℃」與「夏日輕裝」等環保概念，推廣至全港。每次提出，他們均唯唯諾諾的表示支持，但轉頭即依然故我。這也難怪，因官員都是以特首馬首是瞻，特首面對我要求他帶領其班子，脫去外套，除掉煲呔或領帶時，他也不肯以身作則，並搬出「尊重立法會」為理由。難道環保不是市民利益？何以特首連這般簡單的事也拒絕做呢？

說「尊重立法會」，立法會主席早已表明支持夏日輕裝，特首實在毋須緊此等形式上的尊重。且，正如我經常強調，《聯合聲明》和《基本法》訂明行政機關要向立法會負責，故此，行政機關要做到這點，才是最重要，反而兩者尊重不尊重、關係好不好，根本就不值一提。

期望特首能親市民所親，這就已經足夠了！

 

---- 載於2008年7月21日《明報》

千回歸萬回歸 司法獨立不能回歸 -- 練乙錚
文革期間，江青以其「中央文革小組」主要成員身份，掌管全國意識形態，經常到各地重要單位訓話；所到之處，她的話等同聖旨，任何人必須熱烈擁護，否則就是政治不正確、對待毛主席態度有問題；有人描述當時情況：江青放個屁，隨員也大喊「深刻、深刻！」那是四十年前的事了。今天，大陸人民享受前所未有高度的言論自由，領導起碼也不再是江青那種。不過，奇怪的是，慣性「深刻」論者依然大有人在，而且不只是在大陸。日前習近平訪港，遺下兩句有關行政、立法與司法之間關係的話，馬上有人「深刻」連聲，繼而對習的一些批評者口誅筆伐，十多天來見諸各報不下十餘篇。有些固然是職責所在，不得不作「深刻」狀，情有可原；另一些則「深刻」得誠懇真摯。當然，後者也分高下，大抵視刊登的報紙質量而定；質量高者（當然包括本報），所刊此類擦屁股文章，情理俱備，自有很高水平。筆者不才，本想逐一點名評說，惟恐有傷大雅君子，引致社會不和諧，故三思之餘，決定只作泛泛之論；各方賢達，幸勿對號入座。

首先談香港人對司法獨立的應有態度。持什麼態度，強調什麼，都不能脫離時空。對此，筆者的看法有二：其一，內地的司法系統和香港今天的比，不但不同，而且不如。香港不少「因住評論」只言前者，諱言後者。其所不如香港的地方，首先是它的不獨立，處處受黨和行政系統所控制、左右、腐蝕。昨日《明報》報道，揭露四川地震區學校「豆腐渣工程」的黃琦因「非法持有國家機密罪」被捕。他的下場大概就和此前報道愛滋病村、「沙士」內情等國內人士一樣：黨內腐敗勢力以政治原因起訴，法庭聽命以「法治」理由判罪。又近日國內多起群眾騷亂事件，如貴州甕安（六月二十八日）、浙江玉環（七月十日）等，群眾反應不是告到法庭，因為法庭公信力低；他們不滿，是以暴力泄憤方式表達。在香港，這種情況不會發生；「三權」當中，市民對司法的信心最高，因為認為它獨立，甚或比回歸之前更獨立。這個香港優勢極之重要，不能蓄意矮化或隨意忽視。

其二，司法權與其他二權之間，縱然有某種義意上的合作需要（此點另文交代），但現階段香港人應該強調的，是要時刻警惕一切可能侵蝕司法獨立的力量，不能以為有《基本法》規定了，便可安枕無憂。香港特區政府想干預司法，但因為司法獨立，不能公然地做，而是採取「繞過去」的方式，讓法治空轉，如前律政司司長梁愛詩決定不起訴胡仙便是重要例子。而且，香港所回歸的母體，其司法權採取列寧、史大林模式，具有強烈排他性，對香港司法獨立是經常存在的威脅，井水隨時可犯河水。

北京大學出版社去年出版一系列法律學院教材專書，其中《中國法制史》的序文，對中國現有法制的特性及成分來源有很詳盡的描述：「中國當代法制是人類歷史三個法制體系──中國傳統法制體系、西方傳統法制體系、西方革命法制體系──共同影響的結果。當今中國顯性法制（成文法制）的背後，仍然頑強地運行許多隱性法制（不成文法制）；那些隱性法制，更多是中國數千年法制傳統遺留下來的。不管你喜歡不喜歡，不管它是進步還是落後，都客觀地存在和運行。」後面這句有關中國隱性法制傳統的話，對香港而言或多或少也適合，特別是如果我們不時常自我警覺；習近平一句「通情達理，團結高效」，便說明問題；在中國隱性法規裏，情高於理，理高於法；不合國情，法通常無效。但對本文而言，此序的另一句話更關鍵：「毋庸置疑，影響中國當今法制外觀和架構的，主要是西方傳統法制，因為中國自鴉片戰爭以來的法制史幾乎就是一部翻釋西方法律規範、起草中國相應法律規範的歷史。同時，自一九一九年之後，來自另一個西方的法制──巴黎公社到十月革命形成的革命法制，也開始局部地影響中國，並在一九四九年之後全面影響中國法制的框架和氣質，中國的法制迅速蘇維埃化。」這兩段文字，可說是今天這一代中國內地法律學者、法律學生對近百年、特別是近六十年來中國法制性質的歷史總結：其特性主要不是什麼歐洲大陸法形式，而是它的蘇維埃法內涵。縱觀這許多年大陸歷史中發生過的慘事，泰半是源於列、史之徒毛澤東信奉的「和尚打傘，無法無天」，即一種對法律獨立性的惡意威脅和踐踏；說這是血淚總結，也不為過。蘇維埃模式隨革命輸入中國大陸；香港回歸大陸，此模式難道就不會從大陸以漸進滲透式輸進香港？如此形勢，容許香港人不夙夜匪懈、時刻警惕，像保護自己的眼睛那樣保護自己的司法獨立嗎？一位領導人談論香港法治位置時明顯失言，這裏竟然有一些體面人一面高調「保」首長，黨同伐異為之緩頰，一面做注腳文章頻呼「深刻、深刻」，真是滑稽之極。

憲法「保證」了的東西，從來都不會自動落實，在專制國家裏如此，在號稱民主社會裏，亦何嘗不然。統治者和人民的關係裏，始終有對立的一面。美國在「九一一」之後通過的《愛國反恐法》，出發點那怕是為了保護美國人民生命財產安全，但其侵蝕憲法所保證的公民權利之處，卻明顯不過，大量民間反對之聲不絕於耳，反映一種健康力量。阿威爾的《畜牧場》、《1984》等寓言小說，豈是只寫極權體制之下凌駕一切的黑暗勢力？擦屁股文章作者當中，不乏飽學之士，為何連應該強調什麼也不懂得？

 

---- 載於2008年7月21日《信報財經新聞》

親疏有別自有因由 -- 鄭經翰
世界上沒有無緣無故的愛，也沒有無緣無故的恨，親疏有別，自有因由。

周三立法會惜別晚宴，曾蔭權在多月前已答允當晚出席一個我有份主催的宴會，故此立法會一星期前才能確定晚宴日期時，他已經要求改期，可惜立法會認為惜別晚宴在答問大會結束後舉行順理成章，特首唯有在參加酒會後離席，未能整晚與議員同樂，合唱一曲《朋友》。可是，事後傳媒和部分議員仍然大造文章，硬指曾蔭權「親疏有別」，無限上綱至此，欲加之罪如斯，夫復何言。

「親疏有別」可以說是兩年來政界的流行用語，自從曾蔭權前年在報章專訪中提出之後，一直被泛民用作批評特首的「特別武器」，只要他們對任何施政不滿，一句「親疏有別」便好像解釋了一切，理由是曾蔭權做什麼事都錯，因為他親疏有別。

泛民對人不對事

但事情是否這樣簡單呢？四年來，我在議事堂近距離觀察五十八位議員的表現，大致可以得出一個總結：「親疏有別」是互動的產物，不是煲呔一手造成，或不應由他一人承擔責任。就以周三特首最後一次答問大會為例，事前各政黨，包括泛民各黨派議員，都像掛許願樹一樣，提出各式各樣民生訴求，要求救民於水火，民主黨李永達甚至警告若特首無法立即實行派錢大計，便會在當日質詢時不給他好過，明顯是要給特首出難題。

好了，到答問大會當日，曾蔭權提出一百一十億派錢大計，比事先大家估計的五十億多出一倍以上，真正做到救民於水火，他甚至聽取李永達意見，要求同事徹夜趕工，準備財委會文件，爭取周五提交本屆最後一次財委會審議通過。泛民主派的兩大要求，他都超額完成，但當日議事堂上換來的仍是冷嘲熱諷，而泛民議員竟沒有一人敢即時表示讚賞甚或支持特首從善如流。公民黨譚香文仍然拿事前準備好的舊問題來攻擊他，其他則顧左右而言他，說說環保、警權等議題，不邊際。反而馮檢基及譚耀宗懂得即時表態「入波」（Score），聲稱特首採納了他們六大項建議。這說明了泛民議員心態是對人不對事，即使曾蔭權為《蘋果日報》記者拿回回鄉證，即使派錢及趕及財委會申請撥款，在他們眼中只屬理所當然，故此仍然要在雞蛋裏挑出骨頭來。

這就是當年為何前政務司司長許仕仁標籤他們是「反對派」的原因。○五的政改方案為本港的民主發展向前走了一步，但泛民仍堅持要否決，寧願原地踏步（我事後已公開表示對自己當日的決定感到後悔）。這種對人不對事的做法，決定了親疏有別，因為泛民選擇了事事站在「道德高地」，不求政治效果，只顧自己的崇高道德形象，強化他們不畏強權的政治市場定位。八九年之後，民主派一貫的處事方式都是這樣，他們早已習慣將自己變成弱者，以「受害人自居」（self-victimization）作為主要政治策略。

由始至終，泛民都選擇走向曾蔭權的對立面，由他當上署任特首那一天開始，他們的關係已出現了「質變」，因為泛民的大佬們相信親近曾蔭權，會令他們失去道德光環，失去被壓迫的形象，最後失去選票。這就是反對派的政治邏輯，也可說是政治常識ＡＢＣ，可惜本地評論水平有限，看不穿這套政治伎倆。

泛民的確是政治鬥爭老手，懂得將責任推到對方身上，一面誠懇說願意與特首溝通，但實際政治行動卻表明他們根本是講一套、做一套。曾蔭權愈親近他們，他們愈要走得遠，七月十六日公布的一百一十億利民紓困計劃，就是一面最好的鏡子。至此，我完全明白為何特首在回答陳偉業提問時如此斬釘截鐵，對「親疏有別」一錘定音了。

猜度政治陰謀論

讓我在此再將特首的原話照錄一次：『所謂「親」，就係「親近」市民，以市民利益為優先；所謂「疏」，就是「疏遠」市民，以從政者的政治利益為優先，這是真正我心中的「親疏有別」。』曾蔭權的意思其實很清楚，就是他的施政方針，一直以廣大市民利益為依歸，有利市民大眾者親之，只懂玩政治者則遠之。當然，如果能夠好像余錦賢的建議，引用諸葛亮《出師表》「親賢臣，遠小人」的名言，意思就更清楚明白了。

泛民的政治目的，就是要維持一個弱勢政府，將曾蔭權變成董建華式的「政治沙包」，日削月割，只有這樣，反對派政黨才有選票。是「親」是「疏」，說到底，其實都是自己的政治選擇和政治策略的考慮而已。

除了親疏有別論外，傳媒和泛民又喜歡在曾蔭權的民望上造文章，甚至硬指特首推出一百一十億元的利民紓困方案，主要目的是挽救自己江河日下的民望，以及換取四川救災撥款方便通過。這種完全猜度動機的政治陰謀論根本早已破產，不值一哂。政策的實施，最重要是講實際效果，普羅市民是否真正受惠。曾蔭權在回答譚香文的提問時說得好 - 自出任財政司以來，他個人已沒有政治野心，對於個人的民望高低，只視若浮雲，關心的反而是背後反映的民生問題。今次的利民紓困方案公布後，社會普遍反應良佳，至少可令大多數人減緩一點生活壓力，如果反對派的論據成立，難道他們會為反對曾蔭權的利己目的而在財委會內反對撥款嗎？

款救助四川災民。

傳媒以為在政治世界裏有所謂一視同仁，那只是天真的想法，他們一直被泛民的言論牽鼻子走，以為世界上真的有一片純潔而和諧、親疏不分的政治天國。回歸十年來，港人治港跌跌碰碰，走了不少冤枉路，要強政勵治，我們要學習的東西還有很多呢！

 

---- 載於2008年7月18日《信報財經新聞 》

紓困措施須有延續性 -- 田北俊 周梁淑怡
自由黨因應近期通脹急升，日前向政府提出十三項紓解民困建議，希望政府採納以解市民之急。我們歡迎曾蔭權昨日在立法會答問大會上，回應了我們大部分訴求，表明會動用一百一十億元，實施十項利民紓困措施，我認為，這些措施對市民對抗通脹有幫助，故原則上支持有關撥款申請。但有關措施仍嫌未夠全面，尤其是對中產人士的幫助似乎少了一些。

政府提出的部分紓困措施，例如再豁免大部分公屋住戶兩個月租金、多發放兩個月生果金及一個月綜援和傷殘津貼、將電費補貼總額倍增至三千六百元、凍結與市民有關收費為期一年、港鐵全面提供學童半價優惠等，與自由黨的建議基本相同，我們同意應盡快推行。

不過，我們都知道近期食品價格升幅厲害，雖然政府表示會協助消委會擴大格價和報價行動，與內地聯繫以確保供港食品供應充足和穩定，以及與非牟利機構合作，提供短期食物援助服務等，但我們認為，這些措施未足以協助有需要市民應付食品加價壓力，所以若能接納自由黨建議，為低收入人士提供為期三個月、每人每月四百元的食物券或現金津貼，其實更能幫助這類人士。

至於政府向中產人士提出的援助措施，則力度顯然並不足夠。我認為，暫緩徵收兩年外傭稅，只能稍紓中產人士短期負擔，而一筆過一千元的「開學津貼」，又只向領取綜援及學生資助的學生發放，而非「一視同仁」惠及所有學生。反而我們建議免收一季地租及半免無鉛汽油稅等措施，卻未見政府回應，故希望曾蔭權在十月的施政報告能採納我們的建議，對中產人士有更多的援助。

我認為，通脹在未來一段長時間仍會困擾香港，因此政府實不能太短視，只推出短期紓困措施，必須研究長遠及可延續下去的對抗通脹方法。

---- 載於2008年7月17日《東方日報》

曾蔭權非解民困實解己困 -- 李怡
曾蔭權今天將出席立法會答問大會，並會提出好幾項「派糖」措施。香港市民若非善忘，當然會記得他六月底才剛說過，通脹是全球性現象，「政府可以做的事不多」，堅持到十月發表施政報告才推紓困措施，怎麼轉眼間去訪問一下老人與學童，紓困措施就來了呢？莫非他落區訪問一下，才知道通脹對市民的影響，因而要解點困嗎？說穿了吧，曾特首真正要解的，不是市民之困，而是他自己之困。他的困，倒也不全是因為民望持續下跌。他說「政府可以做的事不多」時，民望已跌至新低。他的困，主要是習近平最近來港在他面前說的「重話」，以及左派元老吳康民的進一步演繹。習近平說話的語氣不重，但正如當年胡錦濤在澳門向董建華訓示「查找不足」一樣，溫和語氣暗藏要董建華腳痛下台的機鋒。習近平向特區班子訓話，說要「通情達理，團結高效」；在他觀察馬術設施時，兩條鋁管從天花板掉下「條條Fing」，習近平當場訓示曾蔭權對奧馬要「親自過問」，暗示他把這樣的頭號大事交給唐英年、林煥光之不當。左派元老吳康民進一步演繹習近平的談話。他認為特首民望下跌，不至於導致他的下台，但習近平要求曾對奧馬「親自過問」，就可解讀為對曾的批評。「如果馬術比賽搞到雞毛鴨血，……畀人破壞，搞到亂晒龍，影響國家顏面，就唔可能唔落台……」。問題是甚麼叫「亂晒龍」？甚麼叫「影響國家顏面」？從北京的角度來看，只要出現一個陳巧文，就可以說是「亂晒龍」、「影響國家顏面」。但從一國兩制中香港的言論自由來看，卻沒甚麼大不了，不但應容許，而且只是小事一樁。不過，習的訓示和吳的演繹，都使這個香港極少人關心的馬術比賽，成為特區政府往後一個多月施政的「重中之重」，它很可能會衍化成中央要曾蔭權下台的藉口。光有這個藉口，中央還不能讓曾蔭權步董建華後塵。董下台的另一個可供中央下決定的因素，是民望低迷。因為董的民望低迷，故要他下台並沒有引起市民的反彈。曾特首的民望評分屢創新低，目前距離董下台時的民望評分僅差8分。有報紙以「衰過董建華」做標題。今年7.1遊行有人喊「曾蔭權下台」的口號。因此，若中央藉口奧馬要曾下台，事實上已有一定的民意基礎了。

另一個曾蔭權無法消解之「困」，是中央主管港澳工作因換人而出現香港人事異動危機。在人治體制下，通常新上任領導人，總要做些事來否定前任。胡錦濤要董下台，是因為他接掌了實權，故立即拿江澤民「馬房」的董建華開刀，以示他的「英明」。如今，一般認為，習近平是江的人馬，在十七大的最後時刻，江把他擺上「王儲」地位，而排除了胡的人馬李克強接班，是江胡內鬥的結果。習主導港澳事務，就有要否定前任的傾向，曾蔭權也就陷入險境了。

曾蔭權為保住權位而解困，可做的事情不多。若「派糖」能把民望提升到60分以上，中央要拿他開刀就有顧忌了。但看來絕無可能。因為他的民望低迷，不是由於通脹和民困，而是由於他只懂得順從北京、漠視立法會和民意而自把自為、專橫獨斷所造成的。副局政助風暴，不顧《基本法》有關規定而決意撥公帑往四川賑災，對《蘋果》記者被沒收回鄉卡這種違反新聞自由的事不敢吭聲，習近平說行政、立法、司法要「互相支持、互相配合」他不敢提出保留意見，盧維思失職案被法院指特首失當……。近來發生的所有事情，都說明曾蔭權眼中只有北京，只有在香港能通北京的政商名人，他眼中沒有市民，「派糖」是為挽救民望的不得已之舉。

因為他不是香港市民選出來的。在北京眼中，他也是隨時可以踩兩腳甚至可以撤換的奴才。只要香港一天沒有普選，北京這種耍猴子的把戲就能對這一任、下一任和下下一任的特首玩下去。
 

---- 載於2008年7月16日《蘋果日報》

政治現實主義與跛腳鴨政權 張超雄公民黨立法會議員 -- 張超雄
美國總統民主黨候選人資格爭奪戰，終於塵埃落定。民主黨的奧巴馬勝出了黨內初選，取得了終極大選的入場券。而落敗的希拉莉，則欠下一屁股的選舉債，甚至要尋求「口袋水浸」的奧巴馬協助還債。

曾經在美國生活過的人都知道，美國人民的政治參與度很高，即使是最基層的市民，大都有自己信奉的一套政治信念，而在相關的政黨作政治和選舉募捐時，他們都會毫不吝嗇地作出奉獻，因為他們心裏面都希望，自己的百元十塊，可以將自己信任的候選人與黨派，送上國家的最高司令台。

港政黨政治理念模糊

有人說，如此情況不可能在香港發生，因為香港人甚至政黨們壓根兒就沒有信奉甚麼主義。不論是人們口中的「泛民」還是「建制派」，政治理念都是模糊的。特別是後者，由「建制派」到「保皇黨」這些通俗名字，都可以知道他們所支持的，不是甚麼理想與主義，而是任何當權與在位的人所提出的任何理念。

然而奇怪的是，如此模糊的政治理念，卻在多次選舉中獲得大量的基層市民支持，而且很多時這種支持都是「非彈性供應」，即所謂「鐵票」。我認為，這除反映了市民在不民主的制度下，學懂了政治的現實課外，實在也與香港的民主黨派沒有傳揚其道有關。

曾經有機會與一些傳媒人隔中間人談話，他們說其實香港的傳媒很多人都患上性格分裂症。你說政治理念麼？他們心裏大都相信西方的民主制度。但在本地的現實生活中，他們卻對現時泛民黨派的「逢政府必反」與「事事要求政府介入」不很滿意。尤其是其中一兩間傳媒機構，對自由經濟理念與所謂「香港人逆境自強」的「獅子山故事」很是擁抱，對於類近外國社會民主黨的中間偏左理念，根本就不認同。更何況現時香港的「泛民」，表現有時比這些黨派更「左」。

是的，在畸形的政治形勢下，泛民人士的一些說話，到頭來每每被認為很「左」。而推崇建制、擁抱中共中央的那一幫人，卻又忽然成為極右、保守與市場經濟理念的隨從。如此情況，不單市民難以找到一種具一致性的政治理念去委身支持，即使是選舉的個別參與者本身，在籌募經費與作宣傳時，都愈來愈傾向推銷自己在個別民生課業上的取態與往績，有意無意間不提及自己的理念取態，變相地鼓吹了政治意識繼續不成熟。

美國人重理念與出身

在美國，人民決定是否支持一個候選人，很多時不是靠詳細參閱他的政綱與民生工作「期票」，反而較重候選人的理念與出身，例如他的黨派、膚色、家庭背景等。美國人大多相信，有好的理念與人格，就有好的施政。但在香港，現實主義大行其道，親疏有別的政治形勢，容不下成熟的政治理念發展。政府的行政(不是政治)工作，不斷面對不同利益團體，因政治風向轉變而作出的、無法估計的挑戰。現實上，恐怕無人會是政府的永恒死硬支持者。

最近，副局長與政治助理任命鬧出一場大風波，特首民望急跌，部分議員更提出以特權法案逼使政府作出交代。在過去，政府對於議員如此舉措根本不會放在心上，因為現行的議會制度加上「建制派」議員數目眾多，任何敵政府的議案根本不可能會被通過。但由於今次的事件涉及政治利益分配，即使是所謂「保皇」的黨派，對「派彩」都有不同程度的不滿。如此情勢，加上中央領導人快將訪港，特首心下一慌，甚至可能突然想起周星馳在《鹿鼎記》中的對白：「有數，(老竇都會)點(騙)你」，於是居然罕有地在議案辯論前親到立法會解畫。看來，即使《基本法》如何保障行政主導，「上大人」如何派糖派定心丸，加上所謂政治委任問責制，特首與政府的施政信心仍然可以低到接近零。

如此跛腳鴨政府，如何管理？

 

---- 載於2008年7月9日《星島日報》

政府應重視諮詢渠道 -- 陸恭蕙
民眾的參與，尤其是在影響環境方面的決策，廣泛被認為是可持續發展的必需元素。公眾的不同意見可以發展成一個更好的決定，其中一個例子就是東南九龍發展計劃。另一方面，公眾不同層面的意見亦可以帶出更公平的決定，例如排污費用的徵收就是一個好例子，而且容許遵守條例的市民參與，令到條例更容易得到支持及更合理。

政府通常會因應不同政策向市民諮詢，主要以發表諮詢文件方式徵求市民意見，當然政府亦設立時間限制，大多為三個月。諮詢文件多具有多個可行方案可供選擇，但亦經常向公眾明確表示政府的強力意願。長久以來，大部分人均認為政府的諮詢只是「表面功夫」，因為諮詢提供政府一條通知市民其決策的渠道，但卻沒有讓市民詢問政府方案的基本意義。

其中一個例子是東南九龍發展計劃。規劃署在1998年公佈計劃前已用了多年時間擬定分區計劃大綱圖。這個規模龐大但缺乏全盤考慮的計劃引起公眾、專業團體、綠色組織以及立法會議員的激烈反對。1998年10月立法會規劃地政及工程事務委員會討論該分區計劃大綱圖，十四個專業團體、環保組織及團體表達了意見，亦有不少專業人士表達了他們的憂慮。此外，立法會於1999年1月更全體一致地通過該計劃必須重新修訂。規劃環境地政局局長蕭炯柱之後同意市民關注並承諾會再研究，經多次修訂計劃，新的分區計劃大綱圖最終於2006年公佈。東南九龍發展計劃事件給予政府一個非常清楚的信息，就是必須於規劃的早期開始諮詢公眾意見，否則將會導致計劃的延誤及成本增加。

由規劃署實行的公眾會議已成為之後諮詢程序的標準模式之一，公眾會議通常邀請不同的利益相關者出席發表意見。可惜的是，政府很少提供其意念背後的基本假設讓公眾討論，因為官員大多認為他們只需要到此聆聽市民聲音。此外，政府亦沒有一套完善的系統紀錄市民意見。直至今日，香港仍有不少例子證明政府在進行公眾諮詢之前已在主要事項上作出決定，因此諮詢很多時只是表面功夫，有多少公眾意見能夠左右政府的決策仍是未知數。

陸恭蕙 思匯政策研究所行政總監

 

---- 載於2008年7月8日《文匯報》

Dismissive leadership is failing Hong Kong -- Margaret Ng
Chief Executive Donald Tsang Yam-kuen's whirlwind appearance in the Legislative Council last week was an extraordinarily poor show. Lee Wing-tat's motion may have been doomed, but it certainly was a serious issue.

The move to compel the Chief Executive's Office director, Norman Chan Tak-lam, to produce all documents relevant to the remuneration of the undersecretaries and political assistants was not idle curiosity.

It was necessary to know how the specific level of salary of each of the appointees was arrived at, the principles concerned, whether there was any proper discussion, or was it based on favouritism and the arbitrary decision of one man using the public coffers as his private purse.

The purpose of the surprise visit was soon revealed. Far from taking legislators' concerns seriously enough to attend personally or to offer the information sought without requiring Legco to use its coercive powers, his speech could only be understood as a calculated contempt.

Although it took him 20 minutes to read the speech, the substance was crystal clear. The system of appointment is already fully transparent. You have been given all the information you can get. Do not waste time in a divisive debate. Get on with issues of the people's livelihood.

He refused to answer any questions, although the choice was his. He then swept out of the debating chambers with members standing up to show him the respect he did not deserve.

The principal officials who attended his speech in full array left in a body immediately after him. Chief Secretary Henry Tang Ying-yen, and the Secretary for Justice Wong Yan-lung stayed behind to each deliver a short speech basically repeating the old "line to take", before they, too, left without even waiting for Lee Wing-tat's opening speech.

It is possible that he did not mean to be rude but thought it was a show of authority and confidence which would raise his plunging popularity and prove he is in control. Unfortunately, it did not seem to work.

Now in the third year of his substantive term, Mr Tsang appears to think he can do anything he likes provided he keeps his masters in Beijing happy.

But Beijing's first concern is the effective governance of the special administrative region. Although Beijing may not wish to intervene in the minutiae, it expects the chief executive to keep the SAR more or less content because this is key to stability.

Sadly, Mr Tsang has offered no judgment of what the Hong Kong public really care about.

The economy may be uppermost in the minds of most people, but there are core values which they will rise to protect if they see them threatened. One of them is appointment by merit. Another is check and balance.

The last thing anybody wants to see creeping into Hong Kong's governance is the unbridled dipping into public money by those in power to benefit their favourites whom they elevate to high positions.

The lack of transparency and accountability in this whole affair smacks too much of the cronyism Hong Kong people most fear, not least because it is a precursor of corruption.

Mr Tsang's claim to Beijing's trust was his high popularity rating and his knowledge of the civil service. Sadly, he has not used his knowledge to develop a system of government based on our core values. His supposed strength may prove his Achilles' heel.

Unfortunately, this is not just bad news for Mr Tsang; it is inevitably bad news for Hong Kong.

Mr Tsang came to power because Tung Chee-hwa was shown to be unable to govern when half a million people took to the streets in 2003. Mr Tsang may also be shown unfit to govern.
Thus the urgent need for democracy: it is crucial to good governance and Hong Kong's stability. Neither of our chief executives has been perfect, but the fundamental flaw is in the system of government.

 

---- 載於2008年7月3日《南華早報》

七一回歸平常心 -- 程介南
又是「七一」，香港回歸11周年了。用甚麼方式來紀念回歸最合適呢？政府和建制派陣營，自然會是組織喜慶活動，營造歡樂氣氛，加上官方的酒會儀式，還有授勳典禮等。反對陣營和壓力團體組織等，也自然是反其道而行之，除了年年例牌的遊行示威，也就是遊行示威，最怕沒有好題目，最怕人家忘記了自己的存在。民間廣大老百姓呢？最好的方式，恐怕就是以平常心，度過一天安寧悠閒的公眾假期。

活動的真正意義不大

我個人對於基本上是形式主義的喜慶和抗爭活動，已經喪失了興趣和參與的動力，愈來愈適應和渴望那平靜的「小日子」。主要的原因在於，這類活動愈來愈變得是為了搞活動而搞，包括對於組織者自己在內，其實都明白，活動的真正意義並不大，對於老百姓的影響也沒有多少。

升旗禮天天都有，除了颳大風下大雨，「七一」的升旗禮只是典禮之後多了一個官方酒會而已。遊行示威天天都可以搞，只不過「七一」那一天的人數多少，往往成為7月2日的爭議而已。所以看今天7月2日的報紙，大抵都可以猜到的標題是：早上長毛到升旗典禮示威被阻攔，下午的遊行人數警方說有幾萬，然後主辦單位民陣說應該是加一倍才對。再就是看看陳方安生有沒有來，來了以後又沒有半途去了恤髮。

其實今年的「七一」更值得平常心。面前的北京奧運是足夠老百姓期望的了，剛過去的地震也是夠我們關切沉思的了。特首政治任命副局長的事，坦白說，在一般老百姓心目中，實在也不是天大的一回事，再怎樣不滿也不至於因此「處女上街」，搞手們也省得挖空心思拼湊爭取最低工資+支援性工作者+支持陳方安生+反對徵收汽油稅+ 反對陰乾賣活雞+要求雙普選等的雜牌隊伍，務求谷出一個不少於去年的人數。

最關心有沒有煙花看

在網上看人們討論「七一」假期，最多人提起的反而是究竟今年有沒有海港煙花活動？看來這是最能讓市民和「七一」回歸11周年連在一起的一樁事。看來在這一天假期中，一家大小吃一頓飯，然後提早到海濱霸位，煙花綻放時候，讓孩子騎在爸爸的肩膀上歡呼拍照，才是香港廣大市民最合適的紀念活動。

事實上今年「七一」沒有煙花，也不是年年都有煙花，而渴望平常心也是年年如此。

 

---- 載於2008年7月2日《新報》

融冰好橋 -- 劉銳紹
中央同意立法會議員組團到四川災區視察，成為近期一宗矚目的新聞。因為此行的成員將包括民主派人士，當中還有一些是沒有回鄉證的。雖然這個舉動不大，但其政治含意實在不小。所以，大家都在觀察，走了這一步棋後，官方與民主派的關係將怎樣發展。

無論這個建議是由誰提出來的，這也是一條好橋，抓準一個不敏感的機會進行融冰。我想，曾特首應該多謝習近平和他背後的智囊，至少如果沒有他們動腦筋和同意，誰也不能演好這場大家都愛看的戲。所以，好橋不怕多。行了第一步，就會看準時機，再行第二步。

本來，讓民主派人士回內地的建議，已經提過很多次。今年年初，內地大雪災，香港人也大力捐助，當時已有人建議立法會組團回內地視察。

不過，雪災的感染力似乎沒有激起香港人的高度投入，而且其他條件還未成熟。所以，上述建議仍然未能成為事實。

這次四川大地震，不單震毀了四十多萬平方公里的土地，也震醒了人心，激動了同胞互助互愛的熱情，各種自發性的救災活動前赴後繼地出現。所以，有心人在背後再次提出讓立法會包括民主派議員到災區視察的建議，最後得到接納。

這的確是明智甚至是高明的橋，完全沒有爭議，誰搞小動作，誰就失分，既可救災，又可融冰。

不過，我又想到另一點，為甚麼總是要到災難當頭的時候，才可以找到融冰的機會？

風平浪靜的時候，卻總是互相排斥，爭個你死我活，甚至老死不相往來呢？希望這次救災之後，真的雨過天青了。

 

---- 載於2008年7月2日《新報》

誰能醫治「決策癱瘓症」？ -- 黎廣德
由於市區重建局近年推行的項目引起社會極大爭議，幾乎舉步維艱。被各界催促多年後，政府在上周終於宣布對市區重建策略進行檢討，但檢討時間表卻令人大吃一驚。檢討為時兩年，預計在二○一○年第二季完成報告，再由發展局根據報告制定新政策或草擬新法例。

幾乎可以預測，在曾特首二○一二年下台前不會實施任何新的市區重建策略，這等於說未來四年遍布港九的火頭：如何實現可持續城市發展、如何保存社區網絡、如何保育文物古蹟、如何公平處理居民權益等爭論，還是會按照過時的機制繼續燃燒下去 ─ 這究竟是讓香港往上行還是往下墜？

日前筆者出席了一個有關珠江三角洲地區空氣污染研究報告的發布會，一位香港大學醫學院教授語帶感慨地指出：「雖然這次研究清楚指出每年最少有一萬名珠三角、包括香港和澳門的居民，因為空氣污染而提早死亡，但是我不敢奢望政府會改善政策，正如禽流感已經發生了五次，損失無數，政府仍然不敢實行中央屠宰……。」香港，你究竟生了什麼病？

決策癱瘓禍延子孫

在任何重視生命的文明社會，人命的損失和危害健康的風險是最能夠迫使政府大刀斧、不惜代價改善政策的動力。第一次禽流感已經是十一年前的事，到今天才見到政府高層多一點心，生病的看來就是手握決策大權的高層官員。

特區政府高層患上了「決策癱瘓症」，受害的不僅是七百萬市民，更使專業和商界錯失了無數發展機遇。這種例子俯拾皆是：　　‧為了徹底改善空氣質素，可持續發展委員會兩年前提出近四十項共需投資逾五百億元的計劃，至今大部份石沉大海；　　‧筆者在二○○三年受可持續發展委員會所託，召集了一個專家支援小組，推動公眾參與並制訂了固體廢物管理的可持續發展策略，包括推行焚化爐的建議，而早於一九九八年環保署的減廢框架計劃亦已提出興建「轉廢為能」的焚化爐。可惜直到今天，這個投資四十億元的計劃連是否進行政府也未作實；　　‧電廠減低排放須更換潔淨能源，政府遲遲不決定耗資一百億元的天然氣接收站興建方案，更未研究如何把天然氣應用普及化；相比之下，北京公交部門已投資四十億元更換系統，今年將有五千部天然氣巴士在路上行走；　　‧儘管早於二○○○年政府委任的國際專家小組已經建議進行淨化海港計劃的生物處理（即第二期乙工程），但政府高層至今仍拒絕為這個一百零八億元的項目訂立確切時間表；　　為了解決港島北岸的交通擠塞，電子道路收費系統過去二十年來研究了一次又一次，共建維港委員會委任的專家小組在兩年前也認為建設中環灣仔繞道不能取代電子道路收費，但至今政府仍然是議而不決。

單單上述拖延無期的工程項目總值已逾七百億元。政府只要添加創意，擴闊視野，廣納民意，這些都是可以獲得社會大眾喝采、表現政府能「急民之所急」的項目。然而，政府的拖延卻令社會在環境惡化和公共健康方面，繼續承受難以量度的風險。社會更損失不可勝數的發展機遇，每一位市民都是受害人。

政制扭曲內傷處處

特區政府高層拖延策往往是出於自保心態、昧於國際形勢、不掌握技術關節、受制於特殊利益、或落後於加速改變的市民期望。

尋根究柢，現在特區處處扭曲的政治體制：向特權利益傾斜，行政與立法關係不對稱，政策理念的競爭被迫抽離於政治權力的競爭，都是「決策癱瘓症」的根源。

曾班子的「決策癱瘓症」有一個特點：外表不見瘀痕卻內傷處處。

過去董特首因為議而不決為人詬病，但曾班子的「聰明」之處是把不願決、不敢決的乾脆不議，再用政治化妝術把議題盡量收藏起來。但拖延不議雖然不會引起即時爆發的「外傷」，卻無法避免矛盾在社會各階層擴散的「內傷」。

要在目前的政治生態下醫治「決策癱瘓症」，最有效的方法莫過於由專業界運用科學理據，以無畏無私的態度表達獨立的專業意見和前瞻思維，從而凝聚道德力量。願意擔負起「公共知識分子」角色的專業人士，可以成為民意「造就者」，提供聰明答案，更可以成為協助政府下定決心前進的夥伴。
 

---- 載於2008年6月25日《信報財經新聞》

香港政治向「集體領導」沉淪 --李怡
明天立法會將討論以《立法會（權力及特權）條例》，要求政府提交副局政助聘任文件。希望這次真正關注香港政治狀況的議員不要再失機了。

上周五立法會在保皇派反對下，泛民要求將政府聘政治新貴的準則送交廉署審視的提議，被否決了。唐英年在回應會否「代表政府認錯」時，強調副局政助聘任程序，是「集體參與、集體決定，高度透明，有立法會支持」的。

市民、傳媒完全不知道聘任程序和聘任準則，怎算得「高度透明」？既「有立法會支持」，何以主其事者如陳德霖一直拒絕出席立法會回應事件？何以政府和保皇黨反對立法會政制事務委員會再開會討論？真是你不說我倒明白，你越說我越糊塗了。

至於所謂「集體參與，集體決定」，這個「集體」，包括多少人？是由甚麼人組成的「集體」？是外傳的陳德霖、林瑞麟、劉細良三人嗎？還是再加一個局長？又或者「集體」包括所有行政會議成員？是否每一位「集體」中的成員，都有份作決定？為甚麼除了林瑞麟這個說了等於沒說的滑頭高官「解畫」之外，不見「集體」中的其他人對事件作說明？

對於集體參與、集體決定、集體領導這些話，筆者這輩子聽得多也見得多了。用「集體領導」這四個字打進Google搜尋，會發現所指的都是一黨專政國家的狀況，大部份講的是中共幾代的「集體領導」，連北韓金正日也宣稱實行「集體領導」。至於一黨專政之外的民主國家，則無一國宣稱是「集體領導」的。因此，我們對「集體參與、集體決定、集體領導」是怎麼回事，也就心中有數了。

中共自建政以來，一直都說是集體領導。即使文革毛澤東獨裁時期，四五天安門事件後罷免鄧小平的決議，也聲稱是「政治局一致通過」的集體決定。八九民運時，五個政治局常委開會討論是否要對學生採取鎮壓行動，不屬於常委的鄧小平出席會議，由他提出要鎮壓，五常委中除了趙紫陽，其他持反對意見的常委也只是沉默而不敢公然反對。這就是集體決定的程序了。在這次副局政助的聘任過程中，是否也有類似的「集體決定」？

講集體領導的國家，都是缺乏公民普選的專權國家。民主國家有普選，也就是有民眾授權的體制，因此毋須集體決定，而是獲授權者就可作決定。每一個獲授權者，他的權力與責任是相聯繫的。

民主體制的最大行政問題是獲授權者「推卸責任」，而不是用一個空洞的「集體」去承擔責任。美國前總統杜魯門的名言是：「The buck stops here!」意思是責任止於此，也就是絕不推卸責任。這是民主政體之下，最重要的權利與義務的關係：權力越大，責任越大；到總統這個至高權力時，就不容再往上推了。

民主政體絕無集體領導、集體參與、集體決定這回事。

港英時代香港也無民主，但因為港督是由一個民主國家所委派的，因此任何重大決定都由「港督會同行政局」作出。港督是「責任止於此」的最後一人。同樣沒有集體領導，不會出現由一個空洞集體負一個空洞責任這回事。

副局政助的聘任風暴，意味香港政治向「一國一制」看齊，也講集體參與、集體決定了。可惜上周立法會的泛民主派輕輕放過特區政府這個不負責任的空洞集體。

一個星期後，就是回歸十一周年了。副局政助的聘任議論必須延續下去，以免香港這一制變得漸行漸遠漸無聲。香港的政治沉淪，使筆者想到一句7.1遊行的口號，就是：「不要集體領導，要普選授權！」
 

---- 載於2008年6月24日《蘋果日報》

冷眼旁觀：規劃人文西九 -- 黃英琦
北京國家大劇院在十年前，由中央領導集體拍板興建，經歷一年半的兩輪國際建築設計比賽，吸引數十個來自全球的建築師單位參與，最後選擇了法國人的設計，之後再經過修訂，成為一個置在湖中央、鋪上鈦金屬的發光巨蛋。

我剛到這個巨蛋聽了一場音樂會，在劇院走了一圈後，讓我對文化基建，尤其是對本港西九的未來，有許多的反思。

]巨蛋是上世紀九十年代思維的典型產物。當年，全球城市都認為文化地標能推動大都會建設。然而，「文化」的焦點，是建築外形的創新和宏偉多於文化的內涵。西班牙畢爾包城的古根漢博物館由大師紀里設計，讓不見經傳的畢爾包一夜之間成為文化城，每年增加近百萬遊客，建築可謂驚為天人了，內裏的展覽卻不外如是。

畢爾包的成功，讓全球領導人驚覺「文化」的魅力，認為文化地標能展示城市的品味和地位。於是，各城市都爭相興建文化地標。北京除了巨蛋，還有中央電視台大廈等。中東的亞布扎比最為誇張，將有五個由建築大師設計的博物館。

香港也不甘於落後，很快有地標了。立法會即將通過西九的撥款和西九文化區管理局條例；錢已到位，管理局的成立也肯定了。在八年後陸續落成的文化設施，應是怎樣的地標？我們要求的是震撼的建築，還是具人文內涵的西九？我們要求交通方便，還是像巨蛋那樣雄偉的坐在湖心，從計程車可以停的地點要繞半個湖再走下樓梯，穿過湖底隧道和長廊，經過兩道行人電梯和安檢，再走一百米，才能走進音樂廳？

政府應聽明白市民要的是甚麼，在西九的規劃落實前，必須作出諮詢。知悉陳婉嫻議員將就西九的規劃程序提出修訂，要求管理局在規劃概念、論證和深化三個階段，必須有全面的公眾參與。希望修訂能獲得立法會的支持。
 

---- 載於2008年6月18日《東方日報》

第二類忠誠 -- 馬家輝
副局長和政治助理的國籍風波暫居退潮，剩下來的是錢銀爭議，主要集中在「值唔值」和「須否公布薪酬」兩個問題之上；這兩個問題，一真一假，本來不易應付，無奈特區政府表現劣拙，令爭議像滾雪球般愈變愈大，白白便宜了泛民陣營借之為9 月選舉的攻擊武器。

「值唔值」，根本是個假問題。

副局長和政治助理的薪酬高低，並非為了誰誰誰度身訂做，而是以特區官員整體職級水平為衡量基礎打造出來的一項配套設計，泛民陣營大可不滿意政府把薪酬門檻訂得過高，但若因某幾位年輕從政者於一夜之間荷包腫脹而濫發進攻，難免有「憎人富貴厭人貧」之酸溜心態。

年輕人以至任何人找工作，可供依靠的資源大體有三：一曰經驗背景，二曰知識才能，三曰發展潛力。不同的機構、不同的崗位、不同的上司，對這三項資源的重視比例皆可有異，譬如說，在全球化的大氣候下，不是所有企業和政治都強調「新思維」嗎？相對而言，僅有數年工作經驗的年輕人不是比資深老鬼更具有「新思維」、更能孕育「新思維」、更能實踐「新思維」嗎？

在這邏輯下，年輕就是本錢，年輕意味經驗淺短，經驗淺短意味沒有包袱，沒有包袱意味懂得轉彎執生；僅僅年輕，已替「人才」二字加了分數，正如在美國矽谷的新經濟體系裏，年過30 已經被視為「前輩」了，年過40 更常被視為「dead wood」，新時代有新要求，把年輕論政者拉入政府，曾蔭權和他的大內總管其實大可理直氣壯、義正辭嚴地表示，我看中的是他們的新修辭語言、新視域觀點、新行動策略，而這，恐怕並非自稱「我也搞過論政團體，點解唔委任我？」的50 多歲的泛民議員所能理解，希望社會大眾能從「萬政唯新」的角度看待事情，千萬別跟落後於時勢的政黨一般見識。

年輕就是資本，泛民陣營批評「年輕論政者唔值咁多錢」，悲哀地，足以反映泛民陣營不太明白社會發展的高速變化，一來他們仍然固守於「循序漸進」的舊式薪酬遊戲，認為必須按「資」計酬，資淺者不應有高所得；二來他們仍自困於「從政沒有好前途」的舊觀念，不願承認、也不敢相信一個全新的政治生涯市場已經成形，在這市場內，有全新的議價策略，有全新的議價標準，有全新的議價條件。執著於過往，自限於昔時，很難不舉步維艱，怪不得泛民陣營口喊了許多年「世代交替」，卻一直沒法把「世代交替」搞得成功。美國金牌政治化妝師Dick Morris 說過， 「觀察一位政治人物如何攻擊對手，足以看穿他的政治水平」，由這角度看，年輕論政者不僅獲得了一份高薪厚職，更在踏進官場門檻之際已經引爆了一場關乎「世代之爭」的政壇亂局，讓曾蔭權恨之入骨的泛民陣營露了淺底，這是他的第一樁差事，未收人工，先有功勞，日後仕途無可限量，不在話下。

至於為什麼不是從起薪點而是由「中間價」起標，亦屬無聊之問，說不定年輕論政者認為替民間團體工作，即使義務勞動亦不計較，但若替欠缺民主認受性的政府工作，沒有「中間價」或以上的收入水平便沒法補回尊嚴、面子、風險；能夠爭得「中間價」，也正正代表了年輕論政者具備高超的價格談判能力，僅是這點，便又替「人才」二字提供了間接證明，但這些考慮，當然絕非曾蔭權及其大內總管所能言之於口。

「須否公布薪酬」倒是真問題。

這個真問題本來也不難解決，但政府犯了兩個錯誤，把政治子彈送了給泛民陣營。

第一個錯誤是，特區政府當初根本就不應該故作神秘、強作遮掩。政治助理是公職，掙的是公帑，花的是公費，其具體收入，怎可能不讓市民知悉？怎可以享受「保密特權」？如此淺顯道理，毋須多談。

第二個錯誤是，一旦遭受質疑與追問，特區政府根本不應該左拖右拖、前支後吾。相比於副局長，政治助理的職級低得多，特區政府既愚蠢萬分地替其隱瞞在先，又蠢上加蠢地替其擋駕在後，站在「政治成本」的角度看，實在划不來，也實在令人對其政治智慧掛上千百個問號，除非其政治智慧是絕頂高超，故意擺出這樣的政治蠢態以讓特區市民恍悟：啊，是啊，正正因為特區政府這麼遲鈍愚蠢、這麼欠缺人才，才需要年輕而有幹勁的副局長和政治助理加入，幫幫他們啊；如果原有的特區高官不是每做必錯，又怎需要擺龐大的公務員體系不用，偏要額外花大錢延攬外援呢？

算了吧，別再「憎人富貴厭人貧」了，與其追咬政治助理的錢銀多寡，不如多花點時間心思看緊他們的忠誠真偽，但這裏說的「忠誠」，絕不是指國籍問題。

手持什麼國籍護照，若真涉及所謂「忠誠」，亦僅是表面形式，否則，我們又如何理解特區首長仍常光榮萬分地自稱「爵士」呢？難道因為他擁有「爵士」身分，我們便懷疑他對北京和香港別有二心？ 如果從來沒人懷疑曾爵士是「飲香港水，流香港血」的香港忠效者，除非有違《基本法》，我們又有什麼立場因為別人手裏多了一本外國護照而妄把「欠缺承擔」和「有違忠誠」之類帽子壓在他們頭上呢？

真正的忠誠、實質的忠誠，應是指涉官場新丁們的政見立場。他們畢竟來自民間，也都公開發表過不少政論文章，其中又有人是六四遺老、有人是普選擁躉、有人是環保信徒、有人是社會福利制度的支持者……認真監察他們如何把這些立場和信念帶入政府、如何用自己一直信仰和鼓吹的公義原則來說服政府，遠比討論他們擁有什麼護照和每月收入高低來得重要百倍。如果國籍護照是「第一類忠誠」，政治理念便是第二類，也唯有在「第二類忠誠」有效地發揮作用時，他們加入政府才算是具有符合完善美好的政治意義，也才值得社會大眾的支持和愛護。倒過來說，如果一個人連對自己的理念信仰都沒法展現忠誠和承擔，即使他或她一天24 小時把中國護照和香港身分證用膠布貼在心口上，亦難讓人相信他們會對中國和香港真心付出。

說忠誠不沉重，因為這是政治作為一種志業的最基本要求。Max Weber 是這樣說過的，不是嗎？年輕的論政者，你們一定讀過他的文章。你們來自民間組織，民間組織亦注視你們，千萬別因為丟了第二類忠誠而也丟了民間組織的臉。

---- 載於2008年6月10日《明報》

不要民主變民粹—這是原則問題，蠢才！ -- 鄭經翰
委任副局長和局長政治助理的政治風波愈演愈烈，欲罷不能，繼多名前任高官加入評論後，民主黨又準備引用《立法會（權力及特權）條例》，傳召特首辦主任陳德霖到立法會應訊，披露八名副局長和九名局長政治助理的「薪酬及附帶福利事宜」有關資料。雖然政務司司長唐英年昨天聯同特首辦主任陳德霖、政制事務局局長林瑞麟及一眾政治委任新貴合演一齣「醜婦終須見家翁」，與傳媒高層於其白加道官邸茶，算是釋出善意，但究其實卻不過是「降溫之計」。

這場典型的政治公關災難，完全源於特首辦堅持按本子辦事而處理手法又透明度不足，因而引起公眾疑慮，致令爭議沒完沒了，還有無限上綱之趨勢，演變成一場政治危機。

我在上周的文章已清楚說明，政府根據《基本法》的規定，依法辦事，本來沒有問題，但副局長和局長政治助理做的是政治工作，面對輿論和市民的詰難，危機當頭，應有政治智慧，釋出政治能量，解決問題，否則無法取得公眾信任，開展工作。現時五名擁有外國護照或居留權的副局長已先後宣布放棄，可說從善如流，他們顯示出承擔精神和從政決心，卻與什麼「效忠」無關，並且將會成為不成文慣例，為後來者之楷模。

可是，部分有關人士仍然避見傳媒，或者揀傳媒作選擇性答覆，令人失望。

政治助理政治幼稚

候任保安局政治助理盧奕基最初拒絕透露國籍，其後卻向個別報章表示擁有居英權十年，但表明不會放棄。盧奕基已經退休，年紀最大，根本不符培訓政治人才的原則，敢信他完成今次任期後，肯定不會再在政壇上繼續發展。他雖然是個保安專才，保安局局長李少光有他襄助，相信也深慶得人。問題是，這並非擴大政治問責制的原意，今次的安排，擺明予人鑽空子的感覺，如今他連一點個人犧牲也不肯，市民大眾會有什麼想法，不問可知。

出身自由黨的楊哲安之答覆更可笑。他說無考慮過放棄居英權，因為那是他父親楊孝華在他年幼時幫其取得，不會影響其政治助理工作，所以不會放棄。楊哲安啊楊哲安，你知不知道你得以聘為政治助理，也是你父親大人幫你啊？政治幼稚如斯，又豈能教人信任閣下的政治工作能力？

輿論和政黨可以繼續向這批政壇新貴施加壓力，逼使他們作出抉擇，但把爭議扯到所謂「效忠」問題上，還要逼令政府順應民意，立法規定他們不得擁有外國護照或居留權，卻違反了泛民主派一直和應該篤守的政治原則，萬萬不可。

《基本法》第六十一、六十七和一百零一條規定行政長官、八成立法會議員和司局級及執法機關首長不可擁有外國居留權，我們必須遵守，那是憲制問題。但《基本法》沒有明文規定的，政府卻不可能隨時附加規定，或將既有規定引伸至其他職位上去，因為此例一開，後患無窮。

有說香港已經回歸十年，應該作出檢討，因應政治需要，順從民意，修訂有關法例，尤其是在「效忠」的問題上，更要突出「一國」的原則。

民主黨開歷史倒車

這種說法明顯是左傾盲動和民粹主義，肯定破壞「一國兩制」的原則，削弱香港的高度自治空間。基本法委員會委員譚惠珠久未露面，早前出席有關論壇，形象不改、「風采依然」，卻清楚披露當年草擬《基本法》，其實也有考慮過副局長的國籍問題，最後遵照鄧小平照顧現實、寬大處理的精神，決定豁免。如今民主黨為了反對政府而開歷史倒車，不僅是莫大諷刺，更隨時引火自焚。

須知道，因六四問題和移民潮興起，港人購買政治保險，取得外國護照或居留權，根本平常不過，那完全是歷史因由使然。保守估計，現在擁有外國護照或居留權的港人，至少也有一百萬，大部分屬於精英分子，連同計算家人擁有外國護照或居留權在內，恐怕人數更多。如果事事以「效忠」為標準，無限上綱，什麼要職都要「根正苗紅」，或者一如何俊仁所倡言，事事要遵循民意，那麼不但政府無法用人唯才，連香港原有的獨特性也會受到破壞。

以我們的司法制度為例，律政署固然不少高官都是外籍人士，大法官也有外國人，連終審法院非常任法官，也容許來自普通法國家的外國人擔任。倘若中央政府把心一橫，以其人之道收緊「一國兩制」政策，以現在泛民主派要求的政治標準同樣求諸司法制度，務求「政治正確」，豈非要大批換人？屆時還有什麼司法獨立可言？如果連常任秘書長也須符合相同「效忠」要求，不得擁有外國居留權，那麼所謂「一國兩制」，也就蕩然無存了。

所以，搞政治鬥爭，也要有利、有理、有節，不能為求達到政治目的，不擇手段，只要民粹，不講民主，否則，隨時弄巧反拙，搬起石頭砸自己的腳。套用克林頓的名言和王永平的用語—這是原則問題，蠢才！

罔顧現實誤人誤己

再說所謂「效忠」問題，也並非表面所見那麼簡單。要追求絕對政治純潔和忠貞，單是個人放棄外國護照和居留權也不成，連同家人也須放棄，因為對大部分歐美國家而言，家庭團聚永遠是第一優先，只要配偶仍是外籍，放棄居留權的人隨時可以家庭團聚為由恢復外國居留權。如果一視同仁，反求諸己，已經放棄外國國籍或居留權的泛民主派議員，是不是也要「大義滅親」，要求配偶「誓死相隨」呢？可見這是一個不容易解決的政治問題，政客罔顧現實，只懂鑽牛角尖，政治道路只會愈走愈窄，誤人誤己而已。

如果泛民主派針對政壇新貴位高權重薪厚，卻缺乏承擔精神，不肯稍作個人犧牲，遠離公眾期望，違反港人核心價值，一定會得到大眾認同。但搬出民粹主義，在「效忠」問題上大造文章，則弄巧反拙，因為將會受到摧毀的是港人堅決擁護的「一國兩制」原則。就是因為「一國兩制」，港人才可名正言順紀念「六四」十九周年，四萬八千人的燭光才可年復年地燃點下去，永恒不息。

相對而言，傳統的親中左派今次的表現便可取得多，他們不再高舉什麼民族大義和政治貞潔牌坊，反而實事求是，竭力維護「一國兩制」。

但願他們不是為了維護自己人而是堅持原則才這樣做，則香港幸甚！

---- 載於2008年6月6日《信報財經新聞》

副局長風波 -- 陳文敏
副局長風波可說是特區政府的一場鬧劇，擾攘個多星期後，特首終於開腔，指政府沒有要求副局長放棄外國國籍乃基於「用人唯才」及「依法辦事」這兩個原則。「用人唯才」這句說話已經久違了好一段時間。

如果真的「用人唯才」，又怎會有「親疏有別」？如果「用人唯才」，為何政府委任百多名區議會議員中竟沒有泛民成員的蹤影？

如果是「用人唯才」，政府又可曾接觸民主黨、公民黨以至較接近民主派的專業人士或學者出任副局長？如果「用人唯才」，為何不少獲委任高薪厚祿的副局長與特首的智囊團「智經」有千絲萬縷的關係？如果「用人唯才」，為何會出現楊孝華的兒子獲委任政治助理，自由黨的第二梯隊卻要黯然退黨？

9 名副局長和8 名政治助理，一年的薪酬支出近3600 萬，對一般市民而言，大部分副局長皆是陌生名字，亦不見得他們曾積極參與公職或公共服務，即使在專業內，部分亦不見得是行內公認的明日之星，那麼憑什麼準則和程序來揀選這批全港最高薪酬的見習生？

至於「依法辦事」，政府唯一的理據是《基本法》沒明文規定副局長必須具中國國籍，這是近乎可憐的論據，完全沒考慮到《基本法》要求局長沒外國國籍的立法原意，副局長的職能與敏感性，以及設計這職位的背後原因。且，什麼時候《基本法》沒規定的便等於符合《基本法》？這涉及剩餘權力的問題。當日彭定康何嘗不是用同樣理據支持擴大9 個新功能團體和立法局選舉委員會的組成，結果是背負上千古罪人之名，立法會的直通車亦因而告吹。

明顯地，政府對副局長的任命欠缺深思熟慮，當日不少論者已指出推行副局長將嚴重影響香港的公務員制度。果然，單就任命一事已看到政府行之已久的制度給破壞殆盡。

明明是誤失，當權者卻不肯面對，一意孤行，這樣法治和管治的危機便不久矣。
 

---- 載於2008年6月4日《》

意料之中和意料之外 -- 程介南
久聞樓梯響的副局長和政治助理任命，終於出台。外間的輿論既是意料之中，也有意料之外。

意料之中的是，有輿論批評說，這一批八名副局長和九名局長政治助理的任命名單，明顯是「益自己人」， 「大細超」，這顯然是針對若干有政黨背景者而言，另方面也有批評說，名單顯示了特首企圖統戰收買傳媒，這又是顯然衝着若干有傳媒工作經驗者而來。

我之所以說是意料之中，是在於批評者的角度和立足點。至於具體人選， 我和所有其他人一樣是無從實現預知的。

特首提出要招攬副局長和政治助理，有特定的時代背景，那就是在目前普選還沒有到來，政黨還沒有機會登上執政位子的時候，政府必須「增厚」自己的班子層次，簡單而言，就是組織「政府黨」，否則無法改善和紓緩政府有權無票，議會有票無權的局面。

在目前的同一個時代背景下，有志從政的人除了參加正當之外，別無他途。而參加政黨的從政路徑，只能是投身選民基層，然後參加選舉進入議會，充其量當上了立 法會議員，也就是到此為止的「有限公司」。副局長、政治助理以至原來的問責局長團隊，提供了另類政治路徑，讓既想從政又不選擇走選舉路的精英分子可以嶄露 頭角。

所以特首此舉並非是為擺平政黨，而是明擺着向社會各方面挖角以增強自己班底。故此，物色物件自然是要同聲同氣，忠心耿耿，就是要找自己人，也明說了是親疏 有別。怎可能冀望曾蔭權招攬政敵高手入閣？同樣道理，什麼時候見過美國共和黨總統找個民主黨的猛人做其白宮幕僚？

名單中政黨分子其實不多，這是否正好說明，香港政黨沒有多少人才？

至於說名單中多人有傳媒工作背景，道理也是一字咁淺，當今時政在在需要透明度面向公眾，要對付傳媒自然要找傳媒人啦！

我說意料之外的，是在於本來平常事的外國護照，卻引起了一場小風波。

民建聯的副主席蘇錦樑擁有外國護照，對民建聯其實是好事，DAB 有此等人物在，證明並非傳統左派的代名詞。讓擁有外國護照者參與政事，也是好事且非自今日起，立法會、公務員首長以至法官中大有人在。這是香港歷史的特有 傳統，也成為了「一國兩制」的重要「地標」之一。

蘇錦樑根據特首方面提出的條件應聘，自認被政府視作合乎資格，其間一無作假， 二無隱瞞，三更無作假和隱瞞的必要和動機，何錯之有，又何來所謂「被踢爆」？莫非有外國護照是醜事？

有趣的是，今天緊皺眉頭大義凜然質疑人家擁有外國護照者，大抵都正好是當年回歸前緊皺眉頭大義凜然捍衛外國居留權者，或許在立法會「唱反調」的陳方安生和劉慧卿是例外。

奉勸民建聯和蘇錦樑律師都以平常心待之，切勿掉入政治圈套之中。
 

---- 載於2008年5月30日《》

副局長不是特首家僕--余若薇
特 首任命8 位副局長和9 位政治助理，為何弄至見不得光似的？這批新官由公帑支薪，但各人月薪多少，竟然是一個秘密，兼且是海鮮價，無公開準則可依。還有，當特首、行政會議成員和 主要官員一律不得擁有外國居留權，以示效忠香港時，同樣是政治任命的副局長卻不受國籍限制，道理何在？儘管公眾有種種疑問，但特首沒安排這批新官見記者， 只發放其官方照片和簡歷，透明度極低。曾特首，你以為你自掏腰包聘請家僕嗎？

公務員的薪酬制度雖然複雜，但有規有矩，薪酬大致上與學歷、職級與年資掛鈎，而且是公開的資料。特首與司、局長不屬於公務員系統，不過，他們的薪酬制度同 樣不含個人因素，不管其學歷、資格、年紀、性別，出身公務員或私人機構，當他們投身政府，成為一分子，便只可領取指定金額的薪酬，轉職帶來加薪抑或減薪， 是否值得取捨，各人自行抉擇，總之，政府既不會，也不能因不同人士的個別情况而來個市場議價。

草擬基本法時根本沒局長副局長這是狡辯。20 年前草擬《基本法》時，根本沒有局長、副局長或問責制，而《基本法》規定，特首、行政會議成員、主要官員以及立法會議員不得擁有外國居留權，唯有是第67 條要寫明不超過百分之二十立法會議員可以例外，道理顯而易見。副局長既要署任局長之位，為何可以不守局長的規矩？除此之外，公眾對政治任命的官員有較高的 期望，盼他們不只是「打份工」，而是對香港有一份承擔與效忠。

曾特首，副局長和政治助理不是你的家僕，公眾有知情權

---- 載於2008年5月27日《明報》

我看政治委任制度--陳方安生
特 區政府目前決策的形式越來越專橫霸道，當年在沒有深思熟慮的情況下，貿貿然實施政治委任的高官問責制。在從來沒有進行公開檢討的情況下，又一意孤行提出擴 充政治委任，增設副局長與政治助理兩層政治委任官員，每年多花費公帑五千五百萬元以上。聘任過程，只由特首辦黑箱作業，一言蔽之，縱容特首用公帑去建立一 言堂。近日政府陸續公佈了八位副局長與九位政治助理的名單，也難怪一直被批評為「政治分贓」、「政治收買」和「親疏有別」，很明顯地，這批副局長與政治助 理，與親政府和親建制政黨關係千絲萬縷，要不然就是來自傳媒中人，或者曾經在傳媒擔任要職，與傳媒關係友好等等。究竟開設這些副局長、政治助理的職位，要 來做甚麼呢？當年政治委任主要官員的時候，過半要從公務員當中尋找，兩年前情況亦然，究竟更改制度目的為何？外國固然也有總統委任政治團隊的情況，但先決 條件是這些元首領導人都是透過民選產生的，有人民賦予的授權，他們的施政，都是以人民利益為大前提。

---- 載於2008年5月21日《蘋果日報》

副局長的挑戰--杜良謀
行政長官曾蔭權昨日公布委任八名副局長，成為局長以外，新一層的政治任命官員。副局長的出現，有不少高官私下說明，副局長不是他們的老闆，要他們幫忙，請先 找常任秘書長，由常秘直接指揮他們工作，擺明劃清界綫。而為免起衝突，公務員事務局正草擬《公務員守則》，希望能盡快發放給所有公務員。

記得問責局長初出爐，萬眾期待新局長有新的政治局面，令政府減少官僚，更加面向群眾，但當時未見其利，便見其害，出現局長與公務員磨合的問題，不時傳出問責 局長未能與公務員合作，公務員未有提供協助，反而諸多阻撓，未能令他們發揮所長，公僕則認為新局長不依體制，處處人治，未能解決問題。

也有高官認為，副局長出現未嘗不是好事，日後所有不受公眾歡迎政策，可以由副局長代為出頭，他們可以有更多時間，做好政策研究，毋須在立法會，周旋於不同的政治爭拗之中，只是擔心，一旦副局長不適應，或力有不逮時，又要他們跑到台前收拾爛攤子。
 

---- 載於2008年5月21日《星島日報》

公民黨特首「防賄」策略--杜良謀
現時防賄條例並未監管行政長官貪污，立法會現正審議修訂案，把特首貪污納入相關法例之中，不過，港府並不接受大律師公會及泛民議員建議，反對設立獨立委員會及暫停特首職務。原本預料泛民會在昨日會議上提出反擊，誰知卻無人反對。聽聞今次泛民懶得再鬥，是無心再在審議委員會階段與政府爭辯，正計畫提出修訂，甚至醞釀否決政府修訂案。

在委員並無提問下，委員會逐進入法例逐條審議的階段。為何向來表達要設獨立委員會，及要求接受調查的特首要停職的公民黨湯家驊也不作聲反對？聽聞，已在審議 階段提出意見，並以不同的方法表達要求的湯家驊，認為再在此階段提出意見，已無意思，正考慮透過修訂，或反對議案來表達不滿。

據了解，湯家驊正計畫與黨友商討提出三項修訂，包括特首若被調查受賄時，要放假，暫停職務；第二是負責調查的廉政公署，在調查特首時，不向特首問責，轉而向律政司司長或政務司司長問責；第三是廉署搜集表面證供後，應由律政司司長決定是否要有進一步調查，避免廉署自我審查。

---- 載於2008年5月20日《星島日報》

和尚撞鐘 特首怠工-- 練乙錚
曾蔭權在政改問題上「怠工」，乃不爭之實。人們記得他競選行政長官時，為了擋住來自對手梁家傑在政制議題方面的攻勢，曾揚言「玩鋪勁」；上任之後，匆匆拋出一份政改討論綠皮書，羅列各家之言，便算交了功課。全國人大常委訂出有關可能二○一七╱二○雙普選的決議之後，曾特首更索性躲到中央政府後面，樂於無所作為；在策發會討論上，一是拋出一些非關鍵議題如增加立會議席數目等，二是再三強調本屆政府只考慮「三段論」模式：十年後選出的特首管二○二○立會選舉民主化的事；五年後選出的特首管二○一七普選特首之事，現屆政府只管二○一二。言下之意，是把二○一二選舉與二○一七╱二○雙普選的方法完全切割，避開有關後者的任何討論；若再加幾招「拖字訣」，等到一一年才拍板決定翌年選舉的修改方案，便可「輕舟已過萬重山」，退休去也，其間風平浪靜，建制派可專注發展實力，自己既樂得輕鬆，又對得住「阿爺」，可謂一舉兩得，此便是他「怠工」背後的政治考量。

　　　政府雖然怠工，民間討論卻從未停步。上周五，學者色彩濃厚的「民主發展網絡」提出了相當完整的政改建議，其中有關功能組別的論述更有新意。民網�